The Atlanta Fed's macroblog provides commentary and analysis on economic topics including monetary policy, macroeconomic developments, inflation, labor economics, and financial issues.
- BLS Handbook of Methods
- Bureau of Economic Analysis
- Bureau of Labor Statistics
- Congressional Budget Office
- Economic Data - FRED® II, St. Louis Fed
- Office of Management and Budget
- Statistics: Releases and Historical Data, Board of Governors
- U.S. Census Bureau Economic Programs
- White House Economic Statistics Briefing Room
October 01, 2018
Demographically Adjusting the Wage Growth Tracker
In a recent report, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) referred to the Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker, noting its usefulness as a people-constant measure of wage growth because it looks at the over-the-year changes in the wages for a given set of individual workers. The CEA's preferred version of the Wage Growth Tracker is the one created by my colleague Ellie Terry and described in this macroblog post. It weights the sample of individual wage growth observations so that the worker characteristics resemble the population of wage and salary earners in every month. However, the CEA report also noted that this measure does not adjust for the fact that the characteristics of wage and salary earners have changed over time.
The following table, which shows the percent of workers in different age groups for three years (in three different decades), illustrates this point. The statistics are shown for the unweighted Wage Growth Tracker sample (the green columns), and for the population of wage and salary earners (the blue columns).
Wage Growth Tracker Sample
Wage and Salary Earner Population
Source: Current Population Survey, author's calculations
The table shows that the Wage Growth Tracker sample in each year has fewer young workers (and more old workers) than does the population of all wage and salary earners, a fact for which the weighted version of the Wage Growth Tracker adjusts. However, the weighted version doesn't adjust for the fact that the workforce has also become older over time—the share of workers over 54 years old has risen nearly 11 percentage points since 1997.
Shifts in the distribution of demographic and other characteristics over time could matter for measures of wage growth because, for example, wage growth tends to be much higher for young workers. Young workers switch jobs more often, whereas workers aged 55 and older tend to have the lowest rates of job switching. Other changes in the composition of the workforce could also be important, such as changes the mix of education, the types of jobs, etc.
To investigate the impact of changes in workforce characteristics over time, we developed another version of the Wage Growth Tracker. This one weights the sample for each month so that it is more representative of the wage and salary earner population that existed in 1997. So, for instance, it always has about 15.5 percent aged 16-24, 73.3 percent aged 25-54, and 11.2 percent over 54 (the blue columns in the 1997 row of the table above).
As the following chart shows, the shifting composition of the workforce has put some additional downward pressure on median wage growth in recent years. That is, median wage growth would be even stronger if the sample each month looked more like it came from the population of wage and salary earners in 1997.
All three versions of the Wage Growth Tracker—unweighted, weighted to each month's workforce characteristics, and weighted to 1997 workforce characteristics—are available in the data download section of the Wage Growth Tracker web page. Which one you prefer depends on the question you are trying to answer. The monthly weighted version makes the Wage Growth Tracker more representative of the characteristics of the employed in each month, and in doing so gives young workers more influence, but it does not control for the fact that today's workforce has a smaller share of young workers than in the past. The 1997-weighted version fixes the workforce characteristics at their 1997 levels. It says that the median growth in individual wages would be higher than it is today if the composition of the workforce had not changed (other things equal). Nonetheless, any version of the Tracker you consult in the previous chart tells a pretty similar overall story: median wage growth is significantly higher than it was five or six years ago, but it hasn't shown much acceleration over the last couple of years.
August 15, 2018
Does Loyalty Pay Off?
A newspaper article last week posed the question: Why do bosses pay new hires better than loyal staffers? The article looked at the Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker data on job stayers versus job switchers and noted that job switchers are getting a bigger percentage gain in their pay than job stayers.
Does that mean that people who switch jobs are paid better than those who stay with their employer? Well, it's useful to keep in mind that job switchers and job stayers differ along a number of dimensions, and perhaps the most important is that job switchers tend to earn less than job stayers. For example, using the data that go into constructing the Wage Growth Tracker we see that the median job switcher's pay in 2017 was around 9 percent lower than the median pay of those who stayed in their job. So even though the 2017 median wage growth for job switchers was 3.9 percent versus 3.0 percent for job stayers, those who change jobs are typically paid less than those who don't.
Why is the median pay higher for people who remain in their jobs? For one thing, job stayers in Wage Growth Tracker data are relatively older, with commensurately more work experience. In addition, job stayers tend to be more educated and hence more likely to be in jobs that require specialized skills. Economic theory also suggests that holding a higher-paying job reduces the likelihood of quitting. The argument goes that as a worker's wage increases, other employers will make fewer offers that exceed the person's minimally acceptable wage (their reservation wage). As a result, as an individual moves into better paying jobs, on-the-job search efforts and expected wage growth decline.
So what should you make of the higher median wage growth enjoyed by job switchers in the Wage Growth Tracker data? I view it as an indication that the demand for labor is strong and provides plentiful opportunities for less experienced and less educated workers to improve their circumstances by changing jobs. A job has an option value, and the possibility of getting a better-paying job offer is high when the worker's reservation value is low and the frequency of offers is high.
July 20, 2018
Improving Labor Market Fortunes for Workers with the Least Schooling
A recent Wall Street Journal story observed that the strong labor market is having a particularly positive impact on those with the least amount of formal schooling. Research by our colleague Julie Hotchkiss has also highlighted the potential lasting benefits of a strong labor market for groups of workers who often struggle to find employment. For example, as chart 1 shows, the unemployment rate gap for those 25 years or older and for the same age cohort but with the least formal education is currently near the narrowest gap on record.
The narrowing of this gap over time probably reflects many factors, but one important development has been a systematic shift in the ethnic composition of the least educated workforce. Specifically, as chart 2 shows, the Hispanic (predominantly foreign born) share of the labor force without a high school diploma has increased from about 35 percent two decades ago to almost 60 percent today.
This shift in composition matters because, as chart 3 shows, the unemployment rate for Hispanics without a high school diploma is generally lower than for other ethnicities. Combined with the growing share of the least educated members of the workforce who are Hispanic, this shift in composition acts to lower the overall unemployment rate for that education group.
What's behind the lower unemployment rate for Hispanic workers? It's not clear. But among unemployed workers 25 and older who haven't completed high school, Hispanic workers generally have a higher likelihood of finding a job than do non-Hispanics, and in recent years they are also likelier to remain employed. Both factors have contributed to the relatively better labor market outcomes we have seen develop.
The narrowing unemployment rate gap for those with the least amount of schooling is good news. However, the continuing decline in the share of population without a high school diploma is probably even better news. This share is down from around 16 percent in the late 1990s to 9 percent today. For Hispanics, the decline is even more pronounced. But that decline might also reflect changes in immigration patterns, as it is mostly the result of a decline in the number of foreign-born Hispanics without a high school diploma starting in 2006—the peak of the last housing boom.
June 01, 2018
Part-Time Workers Are Less Likely to Get a Pay Raise
A recent FEDS Notes article summarized some interesting findings from the Board of Governors' 2017 Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking. One set of responses that caught my eye explored the connection between part-time employment and pay raises. The report estimates that about 70 percent of people working part-time did not get a pay increase over the past year (their pay stayed the same or went down). In contrast, only about 40 percent of full-time workers had no increase in pay.
This pattern is broadly consistent with what we see in the Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker data. As the following chart indicates, the population of part-time workers (who were also employed a year earlier) is generally less likely to get an increase in the hourly rate of pay than their full-time counterparts. Median wage growth for part-time workers has been lower than for full-time workers since 1998.
This wage growth premium for full-time work is partly accounted for by the fact that the typical part-time and full-time worker are different along several dimensions. For example, a part-time worker is more likely to have a relatively low-skilled job, and wage growth tends to be lower for workers in low-skilled jobs.
As the chart shows, the wage growth gap widened considerably in the wake of the Great Recession. The share of workers who are in part-time jobs because of slack business conditions increased across industries and occupation skill levels, and median part-time wage growth ground to a halt.
While part-time wage growth has improved since then, the wage growth gap is still larger than it used to be. This larger gap appears to be attributable to a rise in the share of part-time employment in low-skilled jobs since the recession. In particular, relative to 2007, the share of part-time workers in the Wage Growth Tracker data in low-skilled jobs has increased by about 3 percentage points, whereas the share of full-time workers in low-skilled jobs has remained essentially unchanged. Note that what is happening here is that more part-time jobs are low skilled than before, and not the other way around. Low-skilled jobs are about as likely to be part-time now as they were before the recession.
How does this shift affect an assessment of the overall tightness of today's labor market? Looking at the chart, the answer is probably “not much.” As measured by the Wage Growth Tracker, median wage growth for both full-time and part-time workers has not been accelerating recently. If the labor market were very tight, then this is not what we would expect to see. The modest rise in average hourly earnings in the June 1 labor report for May 2018 to 2.7 percent year over year, even as the unemployment rate declined to an 18-year low, seems consistent with that view. A reading on the Wage Growth Tracker for May should be available in about a week.
April 18, 2018
Hitting a Cyclical High: The Wage Growth Premium from Changing Jobs
The Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker rose 3.3 percent in March. While this increase is up from 2.9 percent in February, the 12-month average remained at 3.2 percent, a bit lower than the 3.5 percent average we observed a year earlier. The absence of upward momentum in the overall Tracker may be a signal that the labor market still has some head room, as suggested by participants at the last Federal Open market Committee (FOMC) meeting, who noted this in the meeting:
Regarding wage growth at the national level, several participants noted a modest increase, but most still described the pace of wage gains as moderate; a few participants cited this fact as suggesting that there was room for the labor market to strengthen somewhat further.
Although wages haven't been rising faster for the median individual, they have been for those who switch jobs. This distinction is important because the wage growth of job-switchers tends to be a better cyclical indicator than overall wage growth. In particular, the median wage growth of people who change industry or occupation tends to rise more rapidly as the labor market tightens. To illustrate, the orange line in the following chart shows the median 12-month wage growth for workers in the Wage Growth Tracker data who change industry (across manufacturing, construction, retail, etc.), and the green line depicts the wage growth of those who remained in the same industry.
As the chart indicates, changing industry when unemployment is high tends to result in a wage growth penalty relative to those who remain employed in the same industry. But when the unemployment rate is low, voluntary quits rise and workers who change industries tend to experience higher wage growth than those who stay.
Currently, the wage growth premium associated with switching employment to a different industry is around 1.5 percentage points and growing. For those who are tempted to infer that the softness in the Wage Growth Tracker might signal an impending labor market slowdown, the wage growth performance for those changing jobs suggests the opposite: the labor market is continuing to gradually tighten.
March 06, 2018
A First Look at Employment
One Friday morning each month at 8:30 is always an exciting time here at the Atlanta Fed. Why, you might ask? Because that's when the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issues the newest employment and labor force statistics from the Employment Situation Summary. Just after the release, Atlanta Fed analysts compile a "first look" report based on the latest numbers. We have found this initial view to be a very useful glimpse into the broad health of the national labor market.
Because we find this report useful, we thought you might also find it of interest. To that end, we have added the Labor Report First Look tool to our website, and we'll strive to post updated data soon after the release of the BLS's Employment Situation Report. Our Labor Report First Look includes key data for the month and changes over time from both the payroll and household surveys, presented as tables and charts.
Additionally, we will also use the bureau's data to create other indicators included in the Labor Report First Look. For example, one of these is a depiction of changes in payroll employment by industry, in which we rank industry employment changes by average hourly pay levels. This tool allows us to see if payrolls are gaining or losing higher- or lower-paying jobs, as the following chart shows.
But wait, there's more! We will also report information on the so-called job finding rate—an estimate of the share of unemployed last month who are employed this month—and a broad measure of labor underutilization. Our underutilization concept is related to another statistic we created called Z-Pop, computed as the share of the population who are either unemployed or underemployed (working part-time hours but wanting full-time work) or who say they currently want a job but are not actively looking. We have found this to be a useful supplement to the BLS's employment-to-population ratio (see the chart).
The Labor Report First Look tool also allows you to dig a bit deeper into Atlanta Fed labor market analysis via links to our Human Capital Data & Tools (which includes the Wage Growth Tracker and Labor Force Dynamics web pages) and links to some of our blog posts on labor market developments and related research. (In fact, it's easy to stay informed of all Labor Report First Look updates by subscribing to our RSS feed or following the Atlanta Fed on Twitter.
We hope you'll look for the inaugural Labor Report First Look next Friday morning...we know you'll be as excited as we will!
February 28, 2018
Weighting the Wage Growth Tracker
The Atlanta Fed's Wage Growth Tracker (WGT) has shown its usefulness as an indicator of labor market conditions, producing a better-fitting Phillips curve than other measures of wage growth. So we were understandably surprised to see the WGT decline from 3.5 percent in 2016 to 3.2 percent in 2017, even as the unemployment rate moved lower from 4.9 to 4.4 percent.
This unexpected disconnect between the WGT and the unemployment rate naturally led us to wonder if it was a consequence of the way the WGT is constructed. Essentially, the WGT is the median of an unweighted sample of individual wage growth observations. This sample is quite large, but it does not perfectly represent the population of wage and salary earners.
Importantly, the WGT sample has too few young workers, because young workers are much more likely to be in and out of employment and hence less likely to have a wage observation in both the current and prior years. To examine the effect of this underrepresentation, we recomputed median wage growth after weighting the WGT sample to be consistent with the distribution of demographic and job characteristics of the workforce in each year. It turns out that this adjustment is important when the labor market is tight.
During periods of low unemployment, young people who stay employed tend to experience larger proportionate wage bumps than older workers. In 2017, for example, the weighted median is 40 basis points higher than the unweighted version. However, both the unweighted version (the gray line in the chart below) and the weighted version of the WGT (the blue line) declined by a similar amount from 2016 to 2017. The decline in the weighted median is also statistically significant (the p-value for the test is 0.07, indicating that the observed difference is unlikely to be due to chance).
Another issue that could affect comparisons of wage growth over time is the changing demographic characteristics of the workforce. In particular, we know that workers' wage growth tends to slow as they approach retirement age, and the fraction of older workers has increased markedly in recent years. To examine this trend, we re-computed the weighted median, but fixed the demographic and job characteristics of the workforce so they would look as they did in 1997.
Our 1997-fixed version shows that median wage growth in recent years would be a bit higher if not for the aging of the workforce (the dashed orange line in the chart below). Moreover, this demographic shift appears to explain some of the slowing in median wage growth from 2016 to 2017. Whereas the 1997-fixed median also slows over the year, the difference is not statistically significant (a test of the null hypothesis of no change in the 1997-fixed weighted median between 2016 and 2017 yielded a p-value of 0.38).
Long story short, our analysis suggests that median wage growth of the population of wage and salary earners is currently higher than the WGT would indicate, reflecting the strong wage gains young workers experience in a tight labor market. Moreover, the increasing share of older workers is acting to restrain median wage growth. Although the decline in median wage growth from 2016 to 2017 appears to be partly the result of the aging workforce, there still may be more to it than just that, and so we will continue to monitor the WGT and related measures closely in 2018 for signs of a pickup. We also want to note that with the release of the February wage data in mid-March, we will make a monthly version of the weighted WGT available.
October 19, 2017
How Ill a Wind? Hurricanes' Impacts on Employment and Earnings
According to the Current Employment Statistics payroll survey, seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment declined 33,000 in September. This decline was the first drop in employment since 2010 and followed a 169,000 gain in August. At the same time, seasonally adjusted average hourly earnings in the private sector increased 2.9 percent year over year in September. This increase in average wages was the largest since the end of the Great Recession in 2009. However, it seems likely that the decline in employment contributed to the rise in average hourly earnings. Why would a decline in employment contribute to an increase in average hourly earnings? We're glad you asked!
As noted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hurricanes Harvey and Irma reduced employment in the payroll survey, whose reference period is the pay period that includes the 12th of the month. Hurricane Harvey first made landfall in east Texas on August 25 and again in Louisiana on August 30, and Hurricane Irma made landfall in south Florida on September 10. The storms forced large-scale evacuations and severely damaged many homes and businesses. For workers who are not paid when they miss work, being unable to work during the surveyed pay period means they are not counted in September payrolls.
To measure the size of Harvey and Irma's effect on payroll employment, we first looked at data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We found that the bad weather forced about 1.5 million nonfarm workers who had a job during the September reference week to miss work. Of those, about 1.2 million were wage and salary earners, and about 760,000 of those were unpaid during their absence from work.
Our analysis indicates that September saw a shortfall in seasonally adjusted payroll employment between 200,000 and 300,000 jobs, suggesting that workers returning to work could result in a large rebound in payroll employment. (Not to get too far into the weeds, but our analysis involved regressing payroll employment growth on its lagged values as well as current and lagged seasonally adjusted changes in shares of workers who were not at work because of bad weather.)
What about average hourly earnings? Changes in average hourly earnings over time reflect both the effect of people getting pay raises and changes in who is working this month versus last month or last year. This latter effect can be large during recessions, when workers in lower-wage jobs are disproportionately more likely to be laid off. The absence of these workers from payrolls increases the average wage among the remaining employed workers, even if those remaining workers are not getting much of a pay increase (see this macroblog post for more discussion).
The September payroll survey depicted a particularly large decline in employment in the leisure and hospitality sector, which is significant because average hourly earnings in that sector are typically about 40 percent lower than overall average hourly earnings. In addition, from the CPS we see that the usual hourly earnings of workers not at work because of bad weather is much lower than for other workers. These data suggest that temporary absences from work because of bad weather likely put upward pressure on average hourly earnings, and some of that upward pressure could reverse itself as these workers return to their jobs. If the pace of average hourly earnings doesn't relax, however, then that would suggest more workers getting larger pay raises due to a tightening labor market.
July 31, 2017
Behind the Increase in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation
Prime-age labor force participation has been on a tear recently. Over the last eight quarters, it is up by about 65 basis points (bps) and more than 40 bps in just the last year. When combined with declines in the rate of unemployment, this increase has helped lift the employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio for this key population group by around 120 bps during the last two years.
Placed in the context of an almost 260 bp decline in the prime-age EPOP ratio between 2007 and 2015, this development is significant. Although the unemployment rate is close to what most economists consider full employment, rising labor force participation can indicate that the labor market might still have some room to run before the employment gap is fully closed. (The Congressional Budget Office offers some analysis consistent with this idea.)
So what's behind the increase in prime-age (defined as people between 25 and 54) participation in the last year? Changes in the labor force participation rate (LFPR) either can be the result of changes in the mix of demographic groups in the population with different average rates of participation (for example, across education and race/ethnicity), or they can result from changes in average participation rates within demographic groups. It turns out that most of the increase in the prime-age LFPR has been because of increased LFPR within demographic groups—in particular, prime-age women and especially women without a college degree. Prime-age men have not contributed much to the rise in participation beyond the increased participation associated with a more educated population.
The following chart shows the contribution to the change in the prime-age LFPR over the last year as a result of changes in the relative mix of age-education-race groups (the blue bars) and changes in participation rates within age-education-race groups (the orange bars). It shows the contribution from both sexes combined and from prime-age women and men separately.
Note that the we computed the contributions using six five-year age groups, three education groups (less than high school, high school but no college degree, and college degree), three race/ethnicity groups (Hispanic, non-Hispanic black, and non-Hispanic white/other), and two sexes.
Of the total increase in the prime-age LFPR, most of that was the result of changes in labor force participation behavior within female demographic groups. In fact, changes in LFPR behavior from prime-age men served as a drag on the overall prime-age LFPR. The modestly positive demographic effect on the LFPR for both men and women reflects the higher LFPR for those with a college degree and the relative increase in the share of both prime-age men and women with a college degree.
This development stands in contrast to the drivers of the change in the prime-age LFPR between 2015 and 2016. Of the 24 bp increase in prime-age LFPR between the second quarters of 2015 and 2016, changes in the demographic composition of the population (primarily increased education levels) accounted for all of it rather than changes in average participation rates within demographic groups.
The next chart shows the contribution to the change in the prime-age LFPR between 2016 and 2017 due to changes in the LFPR behavior of women for specific education-race groups.
As the chart shows, the bulk of the demographically adjusted contribution from female labor force participation came from women without a college degree, and the largest contribution across female education-race groups was from Hispanics without a college degree. The increase in labor force participation among women with less education is consistent with evidence of recent improvement in the wage gains for relatively low-wage earners.
Although this simple decomposition doesn't explain why nondegreed women are increasingly finding the labor force to be an attractive option, we can infer some clues by looking at changes in the reasons people give for not participating. In particular, the largest contribution from changes in behavior among prime-age women over the last year came from a decrease in the propensity to be out of the labor force because of poor health or being in the shadow labor force (wanting a job but not looking).
Recently, former Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota has argued that macroeconomists should take more seriously the differences in behavior across demographic groups. The Atlanta Fed's Labor Force Dynamics web page contains more information on the behavioral trends in the reasons people give for not participating in the labor force across demographic groups, and the page was just updated to include data for the second quarter of 2017. Check it out, and we'll keep reporting here on the relative contributions to the labor force of behavioral versus demographic changes—and whether the winning streak for prime-age labor force participation continues.
July 12, 2017
An Update on Labor Force Participation
With the unemployment rate essentially back to prerecession levels, economists have been paying increased attention to the labor force participation rate (LFPR). Many economists, including those at the Congressional Budget Office , believe untapped resources remain on the sidelines of the labor market.
What exactly does "on the sidelines" entail? Discouraged workers are only a small part of the story. To help unravel the rest of the mystery behind the elevated share of people not participating, we at the Atlanta Fed use the microdata from the Current Population Survey to code the activities of persons not in the labor force. We then calculate how changes in each activity contribute to the total change in the LFPR.
The chart below depicts the drivers of the change in the LFPR from the first quarter of 2016 to the first quarter of 2017. (The interactive tool on our website allows you to make comparisons across gender, age group, and time.) The LFPR rose just slightly (about 0.06 percentage points). However, that small change was the net result of much larger countervailing forces. Other things equal, demographic changes during the year would have lowered the LFPR by around 0.14 percentage points. The aging of the population put significant downward pressure on the LFPR (pushing it down 0.24 percentage points), but a more educated workforce helped push up the LFPR (0.10 percentage points). If the age and education mix of the population had not changed, the LFP rate would have risen by about 0.19 percentage points (see the chart).
The following chart further breaks down the behavioral and cyclical components at work. After controlling for shifts in the demographic mix of the population during the year, the largest contributing factor was a decline in the rate of nonparticipation because of family responsibilities.
This is a particularly important explanation for prime-age women (defined as women between 25 and 54 years of age). A smaller share of prime-age women who say they are busy with home and/or family responsibilities accounts for about half of the 0.62 percentage point increase in LFPR that occurred between the first quarter of 2016 and the first quarter of 2017 (see the chart).
To examine factors affecting prime-age men's participation or to learn more about the cyclical and structural factors behind each reason, visit our website.
- On Maximizing Employment, a Case for Caution
- Demographically Adjusting the Wage Growth Tracker
- What Does the Current Slope of the Yield Curve Tell Us?
- Does Loyalty Pay Off?
- Immigration and Hispanics' Educational Attainment
- Are Tariff Worries Cutting into Business Investment?
- Improving Labor Market Fortunes for Workers with the Least Schooling
- Part-Time Workers Are Less Likely to Get a Pay Raise
- Learning about an ML-Driven Economy
- Hitting a Cyclical High: The Wage Growth Premium from Changing Jobs
- October 2018
- August 2018
- July 2018
- June 2018
- May 2018
- April 2018
- March 2018
- February 2018
- January 2018
- November 2017
- Business Cycles
- Business Inflation Expectations
- Capital and Investment
- Capital Markets
- Data Releases
- Economic conditions
- Economic Growth and Development
- Exchange Rates and the Dollar
- Fed Funds Futures
- Federal Debt and Deficits
- Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy
- Financial System
- Fiscal Policy
- Health Care
- Inflation Expectations
- Interest Rates
- Labor Markets
- Latin America/South America
- Monetary Policy
- Money Markets
- Real Estate
- Saving, Capital, and Investment
- Small Business
- Social Security
- This, That, and the Other
- Trade Deficit
- Wage Growth