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February 26, 2014

The Pattern of Job Creation and Destruction by Firm Age and Size

A recent Wall Street Journal blog post caught our attention. In particular, the following claim:

It’s not size that matters—at least when it comes to job creation. The age of the company is a bigger factor.

This observation is something we have also been thinking a lot about over the past few years (see for example, here, here, and here).

The following chart shows the average job-creation rate of expanding firms and the average job-destruction rates of shrinking firms from 1987 to 2011, broken out by various age and size categories:

In the chart, the colors represent age categories, and the sizes of the dot represent size categories. So, for example, the biggest blue dot in the far northeast quadrant shows the average rate of job creation and destruction for firms that are very young and very large. The tiny blue dot in the far east region of the chart represents the average rate of job creation and destruction for firms that are very young and very small. If an age-size dot is above the 45-degree line, then average net job creation of that firm size-age combination is positive—that is, more jobs are created than destroyed at those firms. (Note that the chart excludes firms less than one year old because, by definition in the data, they can have only job creation.)

The chart shows two things. First, the rate of job creation and destruction tends to decline with firm age. Younger firms of all sizes tend to have higher job-creation (and job-destruction) rates than their older counterparts. That is, the blue dots tend to lie above the green dots, and the green dots tend to be above the orange dots.

The second feature is that the rate of job creation at larger firms of all ages tends to exceed the rate of job destruction, whereas small firms tend to destroy more jobs than they create, on net. That is, the larger dots tend to lie above the 45-degree line, but the smaller dots are below the 45-degree line.

As pointed out in the WSJ blog post and by others (see, for example, work by the Kauffman Foundation here and here), once you control for firm size, firm age is the more important factor when measuring the rate of job creation. However, young firms are more dynamic in general, with rapid net growth balanced against a very high failure rate. (See this paper by John Haltiwanger for more on this up-or-out dynamic.) Apart from new firms, it seems that the combination of youth (between one and ten years old) and size (more than 250 employees) has tended to yield the highest rate of net job creation.

John RobertsonBy John Robertson, a vice president and senior economist in the Atlanta Fed’s research department, and

Ellyn TerryEllyn Terry, a senior economic analyst in the Atlanta Fed's research department


February 26, 2014 in Economic conditions, Employment, Labor Markets, Small Business | Permalink

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So young high growth firms that succeed create the most jobs. WOW!

Large successful old firms are stable and neither create nor destroy large amounts of new jobs. The analytical insight is unbelievable!

and to top if off small, risky start-ups destroy the most jobs as they constantly fail. OMG, Nobel Price of Economics right there!

Americans please send even more of your tax dollars to the Atlanta Federal Reserve given the amazing level of research and analytical insights they are capable of.

Posted by: Alex | February 27, 2014 at 01:46 AM

Are the highlighted features of the chart -- that "rates of job creation and destruction tend to decline with firm age" and that "the larger dots tend to lie above the 45-degree line, but the smaller dots are below the 45-degree line" -- stable over the time period examined, or do they come and go from year to year? And if the latter, can that change be correlated in a useful way with events in the economy as a whole (eg the "dot bomb" of 2001, the financial crisis of 2007-8, or the Great Recession to which that crisis gave rise)?

Posted by: Ed Blachman | February 27, 2014 at 09:29 AM

I keep thinking about the pattern and I wonder what it would look like if it was in motion through time. I wonder if it would follow patterns in nature. I also wonder if the large industries 4 years or less move around much since it is so unusual for a company to hire that many employees in such a short time because of outliers. I also wonder the implications for future employment levels as there are fewer entrepreneurs. Thank you so much for posting this. Great article. I've read other stuff you've done that you linked out to. Great job guys. You've found a lot of the critical data points that really matter. I've been looking to find something like this. I will bookmark this page.

Posted by: buttmunch1 | February 28, 2014 at 12:17 AM

One question: Would the chart look much different if you stopped at 2006? The idea is that large numbers of small firm jobs were likely destroyed by the financial crisis. Further, after the crisis small firms have lacked access to start-up funds, thus diminishing gross new firm creation (and its attendant jobs). One can think of the GFC as a seminal event in small firm birth/death dynamics, much more so than for large firms. While it may look from the data that small firms don't have much impact on net job creation, this may be because of the lack of small firm "births" in the past five years.

Posted by: Diego Espinosa | March 07, 2014 at 12:17 PM

The chart is better art than economics.

The obvious correlation between firm age and firm size means that it is impossible to separate the effects of the two factors (on job creation) by assigning colors and sizes to firms and graphing them against each other. The "cure" for multicollinearity is not changing the color or size of data points -- but recognizing that both change simultaneously.

A successful startup firm in 1987 moved along a path from then to 2011 that took them from tiny blue dots in the direction of giant orange balls. What does that PATH suggest about job creation and destruction? We can be certain that companies traveling the same path in the opposite direction have a far higher rates of job destruction to creation. Shall we paint both of them green, and assign both medium-size dots?

Finally, I was confused by the artist's practice of measuring dependent variables along both principal axes, then graphing observations for independent variables as points in the x-y plane. This is perfectly fine if the sole purpose is to describe the data in a compact way. But if one's purpose is to guide the reader's mind toward cause-effect relationships, this is a poor practice.

Posted by: Thomas Wyrick | March 08, 2014 at 10:05 AM

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November 15, 2013

Is Credit to Small Businesses Flowing Faster? Evidence from the Atlanta Fed Small Business Survey

The spigot of credit to small businesses appears to be turning faster. As of June 2013, outstanding amounts of small loans on the balance sheets of banks were 4 percent higher than their September 2012 levels, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. While they are still 12 percent off 2007 levels, the recent increase is encouraging.

The turnaround in small loan portfolios is not the only sign of improved credit flows to small businesses. The Fed’s October 2013 senior loan officer survey indicates that credit terms to small firms have gradually eased since the second quarter of 2010. Approval ratings of banks and alternative lenders, as measured by Biz2Credit’s lending index, have also risen steadily over the past two years.

In addition to these positive signs, the Atlanta Fed’s third-quarter 2013 Small Business Survey has revealed signs of improvement among small business borrowers in the Southeast. The survey asked recent borrowers about their requests for credit and how successful they were at each place they applied. We also asked, “Over ALL your applications for credit, to what extent were you total financing needs met?” This measure of overall financing satisfaction showed some signs of improvement in the third quarter.

Chart 1 compares the overall financing satisfaction of small business borrowers in the first and third quarter of 2013. The portion of firms that received the full amount requested rose from 28 percent in the first quarter to 42 percent in the third quarter. Meanwhile, the portion that received none of the credit requested declined from 31 percent of the sample in the first quarter to 22 percent in the third quarter.

Chart 1: Overall Financing Satisfaction

Further, financing satisfaction rose across a variety of dimensions. Chart 2 shows how average financing satisfaction changed for young firms and mature firms, across industries and by recent sales performance. In all cases, there were increases in the average amount of financing received from the first to the third quarter of 2013.

Chart 2: Average Amount of Financing Received Overall

This broad-based increase in overall financing satisfaction is encouraging. Greater financial health of the applicant pool helped fuel the improvement in borrowing conditions. In the October survey, 52 percent of businesses reported that sales increased while 34 percent reported decreases. Sales have improved significantly from a year ago, when about as many firms reported sales increases as reported decreases. Measures of hiring and capital improvements over the year have also improved for the average firm in the survey (see chart 3).

131115c

Lending standards have been improving and small businesses have been slowly gaining momentum, but many obstacles remain. Open-ended questions in our survey revealed that small businesses are still concerned about a number of factors, including the general political and economic uncertainty, the impact of the Affordable Care Act, the higher collateral and personal guarantees required to obtain financing, and regulatory requirements that restrict lending. So while conditions on the ground seem to be improving for small businesses, there still appear to be headwinds that may be holding back a greater pace of improvement.

Read the full survey results.

Photo of Ellie TerryBy Ellie Terry, an economic policy analysis specialist in the Atlanta Fed’s research department


November 15, 2013 in Economic conditions, Small Business | Permalink

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The current news about healthcare has many small business owners wary about hiring, employee raises and compensation packages. While the renewal of existing healthcare policies is still goin on, the future cost and coverage will place an additional burden that has not been discussed. it will vacuum a large amount of money out of the economy that will go to government beauracracy that will not be available for our consumer driven economy. No one seems to realize that the additional cost, whether it comes from any generation/segment of the economy, will dampen the economic outlook. The trends reported are great signs that the economy is beginning to turn around but the headwind is healthcare and its uncalculated costs in the future. The press wants to focus on providing afforable care and fails to do an in depth job of getting to the real price that is being paid to create this illusion.

Posted by: George Kurz | November 18, 2013 at 09:03 AM

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October 18, 2013

Why Was the Housing-Price Collapse So Painful? (And Why Is It Still?)

Foresight about the disaster to come was not the primary reason this year’s Nobel Prize in economics went to Robert Shiller (jointly with Eugene Fama and Lars Hansen). But Professor Shiller’s early claim that a housing-price bubble was full on, and his prediction that trouble was a-comin’, is arguably the primary source of his claim to fame in the public sphere.

Several years down the road, the causes and effects of the housing-price run-up, collapse, and ensuing financial crisis are still under the microscope. Consider, for example, this opinion by Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research:

...the downturn is not primarily a “financial crisis.” The story of the downturn is a simple story of a collapsed housing bubble. The $8 trillion housing bubble was driving demand in the U.S. economy in the last decade until it collapsed in 2007. When the bubble burst we lost more than 4 percentage points of GDP worth of demand due to a plunge in residential construction. We lost roughly the same amount of demand due to a falloff in consumption associated with the disappearance of $8 trillion in housing wealth.

The collapse of the bubble created a hole in annual demand equal to 8 percent of GDP, which would be $1.3 trillion in today’s economy. The central problem facing the U.S., the euro zone, and the U.K. was finding ways to fill this hole.

In part, Baker’s post relates to an ongoing pundit catfight, which Baker himself concedes is fairly uninteresting. As he says, “What matters is the underlying issues of economic policy.” Agreed, and in that light I am skeptical about dismissing the centrality of the financial crisis to the story of the downturn and, perhaps more important, to the tepid recovery that has followed.

Interpreting what Baker has in mind is important, so let me start there. I have not scoured Baker’s writings for pithy hyperlinks, but I assume that his statement cited above does not deny that the immediate post-Lehman period is best characterized as a period of panic leading to severe stress in financial markets. What I read is his assertion that the basic problem—perhaps outside the crisis period in late 2008—is a rather plain-vanilla drop in wealth that has dramatically suppressed consumer demand, and with it economic growth. An assertion that the decline in wealth is what led us into the recession, is what accounts for the depth and duration of the recession, and is what’s responsible for the shallow recovery since.

With respect to the pace of recovery, evidence supports the proposition that financial crises without housing busts are not so unique—or if they are, the data tend to associate financial-related downturns with stronger-than-average recoveries. Mike Bordo and Joe Haubrich, respectively from Rutgers University and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, argue that the historical record of U.S. recessions leads us to view housing and the pace of residential investment as the key to whether tepid recoveries will follow sharp recessions:

Our analysis of the data shows that steep expansions tend to follow deep contractions, though this depends heavily on when the recovery is measured. In contrast to much conventional wisdom, the stylized fact that deep contractions breed strong recoveries is particularly true when there is a financial crisis. In fact, on average, it is cycles without a financial crisis that show the weakest relation between contraction depth and recovery strength. For many configurations, the evidence for a robust bounce-back is stronger for cycles with financial crises than those without...

Our results also suggest that a sizeable fraction of the shortfall of the present recovery from the average experience of recoveries after deep recessions is due to the collapse of residential investment.

From here, however, it gets trickier to reach conclusions about why changes in housing values are so important. Simply put, why should there be a “wealth effect” at all? If the price of my house falls and I suffer a capital loss, I do in fact feel less wealthy. But all potential buyers of my house just gained the opportunity to obtain my house at a lower price. For them, the implied wealth gain is the same as my loss. If buyers and sellers essentially behave the same way, why should there be a large impact on consumption? *

I think this notion quickly leads you to the thought there is something fundamentally special about housing assets and that this special role relates to credit markets and finance. This angle is clearly articulated in these passages from a Bloomberg piece earlier in the year, one of a spate of articles in the spring about why rapidly recovering house prices were apparently not driving the recovery into a higher gear:

The wealth effect from rising house prices may not be as effective as it once was in spurring the U.S. economy...

The wealth effect “is much smaller,” said Amir Sufi, professor of finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Sufi, who participated in last year’s central-bank conference at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, reckons that each dollar increase in housing wealth may yield as little as an extra cent in spending. That compares with a 3-to-5-cent estimate by economists prior to the recession.

Many homeowners are finding they can’t refinance their mortgages because banks have tightened credit conditions so much they’re not eligible for new loans. Most who can refinance are opting not to withdraw equity after the first nationwide decline in house prices since the Great Depression reminded them home values can fall as well as rise...

Others are finding it difficult to refinance because credit has become a lot harder to come by. And that situation could worsen as banks respond to stepped-up government oversight.

“Credit is going to get tighter before it gets easier,” said David Stevens, president and chief executive officer of the Washington-based Mortgage Bankers Association...

“Households that have been through foreclosure or have underwater mortgages or are otherwise credit-constrained are less able than other households to take advantage” of low interest rates, Fed Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin said in an April 18 speech in New York.

(I should note that Sufi et al. previously delved into the relationship between household balance sheets and the economic downturn here.)

A more systematic take comes from the Federal Reserve Board’s Matteo Iacoviello:

Empirically, housing wealth and consumption tend to move together: this could happen because some third factor moves both variables, or because there is a more direct effect going from one variable to the other. Studies based on time-series data, on panel data and on more detailed, recent micro data point suggest that a considerable portion of the effect of housing wealth on consumption reflects the influence of changes in housing wealth on borrowing against such wealth.

That sounds like a financial problem to me and, in the spirit of Baker’s plea that it is the policy that matters, this distinction is more than semantic. The policy implications of an economic shock that alters the capacity to engage in borrowing and lending are not necessarily the same as those that result from a straightforward decline in wealth.

Having said that, it is not so clear how the policy implications are different. One possibility is that diminished access to credit markets also weakens policy-transmission mechanisms, calling for even more aggressive demand-oriented “pump-priming” policies of the sort Dean Baker advocates. But it is also possible that we have entered a period of deep structural repair that only time (and not merely government stimulus) can (or should) engineer: deleveraging and balance sheet repair, sectoral resource reallocation, new consumption habits, new business models driven by both market and regulatory imperatives, you name it.

In my view, it’s not yet clear which policy approach is closest to optimal. But I am fairly well convinced that good judgment will require us to think of the past decade as the financial event it was, and in many ways still is.

*Update: A colleague pointed out that my example describing housing price changes and wealth effects may be simplified to the point of being misleading. Implicitly, I am in fact assuming that the flow of housing services derived from housing assets is fixed, a condition that obviously would not hold in general. See section 3 of the Iacoviello paper cited above for a theoretical description of why, to a first approximation, we would not expect there to be a large consumption effect from changes in housing values.

David Altig By Dave Altig, executive vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed


October 18, 2013 in Economic conditions, Housing, Pricing, Real Estate | Permalink

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A primary residence's home price reflects the economic value to a homeowner of living in an area. The major part of the economic value of living somewhere is future expected earnings. The home price will not exceed the economic value to the marginal buyer. When expectations of future earnings decline home prices will decline across the board.

Using housing wealth is just intertemporal substitution. Refinancing is self-financing with homeowners self-qualifying themselves for the mortgage debt. Bank restrictions can limit refinancing but most homeowners will not refinance if they belive they cannot afford to repay the debt or sell above mortgage amounts.

Home price appreciation and the ability to pay back the refinancing or first mortgage debt depend on expectations of a continuation of wage growth to the borrower, or future homebuyer (if one expects to sell prior to debt payoff). A decline in expected wage growth rates (productivity) will cause home prices to decline, unemployment to increase and wages to stagnate.

Wage and GDP growth are linked to capital investment and there has been a sharp decline in US capital investment, which is continuing. If the decrease in capital investment was anticipated (expected), then whatever shock caused the decline in investment is also causing the continuing slow recovering.

Home price decline and the continuing slow recovery have common causes.

Posted by: Milton Recht | October 18, 2013 at 06:24 PM

For those of us between 20-40, first time buyers or up-graders, high land/building prices are very much a drag on our budget. This also includes high rents for the businesses we are starting.

My parents were able to buy their first house in their early twenties on a single blue collar income with a 40% down payment that took only a few years to accumulate. That seems utterly utopian among my peers.

In the long term, high housing prices is a drag on the economy. Do high gasoline prices help people because they feel their cars' tank is worth more?

The only people benefiting from rising house prices are people speculating, those who buy or build with the intent to sell.

Posted by: Benoit Essiambre | October 19, 2013 at 08:45 AM

Mr. Altig, the reason housing mattered so much in the late 2000s, and more than it had in previous times, was precisely because the housing "wealth effect" was just about the only thing normal people had going for them.

While wealth seemed to be increasing in the financial sector, much of that, as we learned, was piggy-backed on the notion that houses would always increase in value--and on the widespread idea that any loan was a good loan because you could bundle it and sell it off.

Much of the rest of the country's GDP improvements came in tech, but tech lately tends to destroy the wealth of everyday people as it automates and outsources their jobs.

That's why the late 1990s/early 2000s real estate boom needs to be seen as a response to a fading job market. The end of job security and the ever-declining wages for ordinary workers meant millions of people taking up the business of flipping houses.

The bubble's runup cannot be understood except in this context. Most people did not want to become mortgage fraudsters. But economic circumstances changed to make house-flipping and mortgage fraud the most (and mostly the only) lucrative option for people who used to be bank tellers and salesmen and low-level software developers.

And right: there has as yet been no policy changes designed to either increase wages or create honest jobs for everyday people. Absent action on this concern, the only question before us is, What will bubble next?

Posted by: Edward Ericson Jr. | October 21, 2013 at 03:35 PM

A couple of issues not mentioned abut the "wealth effect":

During the bubble, many folks bought houses with little or no downpayment. Many bought houses with loans that were not really affordable for them in the long term because of the terms of the loan or the because the actual issuance of the loan was, shall we say, irregular. So when rates rose or prices went down, they had no buffer.

Many who had houses they could afford or even paid off took the wealth effect somewhat literally and spent it, in the form of equity loans, thanks to the same low rate, loose terms, and irregularities. The "wealth" they had just spent turned out to be a short-lived ephemeral delusion, but the debt was durable.

Posted by: MacCruiskeen | October 22, 2013 at 07:24 AM

During the peak of the housing bubble, consumers were taking out $100B/month in new debt:

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?g=nG5

I find it stunning that people still don't understand this basic aspect of the reality of the erstwhile "Bush Boom".

It was all borrowed money! Trillions! Flowing to millions of households, and creating millions of jobs via this stealth stimulus.

But it was all ponzi-based, as the specuvesting was being supported by more and more "suicide" lending products and outright fraud at all levels of the FIRE sector, from customer-facing brokers to the ratings agencies stamping AAA on CDOs.

What got the housing appreciation train going in 2002 was Greenspan's lower interest rates and the 2001-2003 tax cuts, which empowered homebuyers to bid up the cost of housing more.

Momentum kept the game going in 2004, but the smart money started getting out in 2005, leaving the field to idiots stampeded into buying then or being priced out forever (plus millions of specuvestors like Casey Serin playing with OPM).

Drop $100B/month onto the middle class again and we'd have a helluva great economy again, like we did in 2004-2005.

Posted by: Troy | October 23, 2013 at 10:01 PM

Don't forget the fraudulent nature of the house price increases in much of the country.

In many many places, loans were issued and properties flipped because lenders and/or borrowers were blatantly writing fraudulent loan paperwork. Prices were inflated above sustainable economic value as a result. Those who sold received ill-gotten gains; those who bought and held were forced to pay higher prices than they should have - they were robbed. Those who flipped paper received ill-gotten gains; those who bought the AAA-rated bonds and didn't get their interest or principal back were robbed. Those who borrowed against the higher, fraudulent prices, thinking that rising prosperity and declining rates would make refinancing later affordable, were tricked too. In fact, never in the course of human events have so many been robbed so badly, by so few.

Wondering why the eventual collapse was so painful is a ludicrous pastime for "economists". The net worth of the overwhelming majority of Americans is entirely in their home equity. Or was. Many folks lost their entire net worth. Rebuilding that takes time in the best of circumstances, and even more so now, given the structural problems in the economy. Furthermore, many of these folks were burned so badly that they will refuse to partake in a repeat.

The Federal Reserve, among many other institutions, was AWOL when it should have been regulating to prevent all of this. Greenspan is recently on record claiming that fraud is a law-enforcement issue, not a Federal Reserve issue. That is nonfeasance. The Fed has regulatory powers and anything that leads to "bezzle" on the balance sheets (to borrow a term from J.K. Galbraith) is also a regulatory issue because it means banks haven't got the capital base they claim to have. There was plenty of evidence available to those willing to look for it.

I suspect that 100 years from now, History is not going to look kindly on anything the Fed did from about 2002-present.

Posted by: Sustainable Gains | October 24, 2013 at 12:18 AM

You should look at Richard Koo's work on balance sheet recessions to get an understanding of the dynamic.

Simply put, if a household or business owns assets financed by debt,and that asset has declined in value, the household reduces consumption and increases savings/reduces debt to reduce the risk of default.

It is important to understand because debt is reduced under these circumstances irrespective of the interest rate.

Posted by: RichL | October 24, 2013 at 04:43 PM

Here's a table, compiled by former Fed Governor Larry Lindsey, that explains much of the pain from the housing-bubble collapse. The lower 75% of households (by wealth) have still not recovered their peak wealth.

http://www.portphillippublishing.com.au/DR20131118c.jpg

This is consistent with what I wrote above; glad to see someone with the right background is looking into this.

Too bad it's too late; the next bubble is already upon us, and no one in a position of authority was willing to take away the punchbowl early enough.

Posted by: Sustainable Gains | November 18, 2013 at 02:43 PM

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October 04, 2013

Certain about Uncertainty

The Bloom-Davis index of Economic Policy Uncertainty hit 162 in September, up from 102 in August and the highest level seen since December 2012. With all this uncertainty, we can be certain that the events surrounding the government shutdown are having an impact.

This notion of increased uncertainty is captured nicely in our most recent poll of small businesses in the Southeast (past results available here), which went live on September 30, the day before the government shutdown. Although the survey is still out in the field, some early results show:

  • Most firms are expressing more uncertainty (see the chart),
  • For a significant portion of firms, uncertainty today is having a greater impact than six months ago, and
  • The government is heavily featured as a source of the uncertainty.

Macroblog_2013-10-04A

Of course, what we really care about is whether higher uncertainty is affecting economic activity. When asked, 45 percent of our respondents indicate that uncertainty is in fact having a greater impact on their business than six months ago, up from 37 percent in the first-quarter 2013 survey (relative to fall 2012). Further, fewer firms so far have indicated that uncertainty is having less of an impact. In the current survey, 9 percent of firms have reported less of an effect, compared with 16 percent at the close of last April's survey.

Macroblog_2013-10-04B

And what are the sources of uncertainty, as seen by our panel of businesses? Eighty-percent of participants have responded to our open-ended question about the primary source(s) of uncertainty. The following "word cloud" summarizes their views:


We will get more responses to the survey over the next week or so, and these may show a different picture. But we're pretty certain of one thing—the duration of the current fiscal impasse in Washington will make a difference.

John RobertsonBy John Robertson, vice president and senior economist, and

 

Ellyn TerryEllyn Terry, economic policy analysis specialist, both in the research department of the Atlanta Fed


October 4, 2013 in Economic conditions, Small Business | Permalink

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