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April 10, 2014

Reasons for the Decline in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation

As a follow up to this post on recent trends in labor force participation, we look specifically at the prime-age group of 25- to 54-year-olds. The participation decisions of this age cohort are less affected by the aging population and the longer-term trend toward lower participation of youths because of rising school enrollment rates. In that sense, they give us a cleaner window on responses of participation to changing business cycle conditions.

The labor force participation rate of the prime-age group fell from 83 percent just before the Great Recession to 81 percent in 2013. The participation rate of prime-age males has been trending down since the 1960s. The participation rate of women, which had been rising for most of the post-World War II period, appears to have plateaued in the 1990s and has more recently shared the declining pattern of participation for prime-age men. But the decline in participation for both groups appears to have accelerated between 2007 and 2013 (see chart 1).

140410_1

We look at the various reasons people cite for not participating in the labor force from the monthly Current Population Survey. These reasons give us some insight into the impact of changes in employment conditions since 2007 on labor force participation. The data on those not in the official labor force can be broken into two broad categories: those who say they don't currently want a job and those who say they do want a job but don't satisfy the active search criteria for being in the official labor force. Of the prime-age population not in the labor force, most say they don't currently want a job. At the end of 2007, about 15 percent of 25- to 54-year-olds said they didn't want a job, and slightly fewer than 2 percent said they did want a job. By the end of 2013, the don't-want-a-job share had reached nearly 17 percent, and the want-a-job share had risen to slightly above 2 percent (see chart 2).

140410_2

Prime-Age Nonparticipation: Currently Want a Job
Most of the rise in the share of the prime-age population in the want-a-job category is due to so-called marginally attached individuals—they are available and want a job, have looked for a job in the past year, but haven't looked in the past four weeks—especially those who say they are not currently looking because they have become discouraged about job-finding prospects (see the blue and orange lines of chart 3). In 2013, there were about 1.1 million prime-age marginally attached individuals compared to 0.7 million in 2007, and the prime-age marginally attached accounted for about half of all marginally attached in the population.

140410_3

The marginally attached are aptly named in the sense that they have a reasonably high propensity to reenter the labor force—more than 40 percent are in the labor force in the next month and more than 50 percent are in the labor force 12 months later (see chart 4). This macroblog post discusses what the relative stability in the flow rate from marginally attached to the labor force means for thinking about the amount of slack labor resources in the economy.

140410_4

Prime-Age Nonparticipation: Currently Don't Want a Job
As chart 2 makes evident, the vast majority of the rise in prime-age nonparticipation since 2009 is due to the increase in those saying they do not currently want a job. The largest contributors to the increase are individuals who say they are too ill or disabled to work or who are in school or training (see the orange and blues lines in chart 5).

140410_5

Those who say they don't want a job because they are disabled have a relatively low propensity to subsequently (re)enter the labor force. So if the trend of rising disability persists, it will put further downward pressure on prime-age participation. Those who say they don't currently want a job because they are in school or training have a much greater likelihood of (re)entering the labor force, although this tendency has declined slightly since 2007 (see chart 6).

140410_6

Note that the number of people in the Current Population Survey citing disability as the reason for not currently wanting a job is not the same as either the number of people applying for or receiving social security disability insurance. However, a similar trend has been evident in overall disability insurance applications and enrollments (see here).

Some of the rise in the share of prime-age individuals who say they don't want a job could be linked to erosion of skills resulting from prolonged unemployment or permanent changes in the composition of demand (a different mix of skills and job descriptions). It is likely that the rise in share of prime-age individuals not currently wanting a job because they are in school or in training is partly a response to the perception of inadequate skills. The increase in recent years is evident across all ages until about age 50 but is especially strong among the youngest prime-age individuals (see chart 7).

140410_7

But lack of required skills is not the only plausible explanation for the rise in the share of prime-age individuals who say they don't currently want a job. For instance, the increased incidence of disability is partly due to changes in the age distribution within the prime-age category. The share of the prime-age population between 50 and 54 years old—the tail of the baby boomer cohort—has increased significantly (see chart 8).

140410_8

This increase is important because the incidence of reported disability within the prime-age population increases with age and has become more common in recent years, especially for those older than 45 (see chart 9).

140410_9

Conclusions
The health of the labor market clearly affects the decision of prime-age individuals to enroll in school or training, apply for disability insurance, or stay home and take care of family. Discouragement over job prospects rose during the Great Recession, causing many unemployed people to drop out of the labor force. The rise in the number of prime-age marginally attached workers reflects this trend and can account for some of the decline in participation between 2007 and 2009.

But most of the postrecession rise in prime-age nonparticipation is from the people who say they don't currently want a job. How much does that increase reflect trends established well before the recession, and how much can be attributed to the recession and slow recovery? It's hard to say with much certainty. For example, participation by prime-age men has been on a secular decline for decades, but the pace accelerated after 2007—see here for more discussion.

Undoubtedly, some people will reenter the labor market as it strengthens further, especially those who left to undertake additional training. But for others, the prospect of not finding a satisfactory job will cause them to continue to stay out of the labor market. The increased incidence of disability reported among prime-age individuals suggests permanent detachment from the labor market and will put continued downward pressure on participation if the trend continues. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the prime-age participation rate will stabilize around its 2013 level. Given all the contradictory factors in play, we think this projection should have a pretty wide confidence interval around it.

Note: All data shown are 12-month moving averages to emphasize persistent shifts in trends.

Melinda PittsBy Melinda Pitts, director, Center for Human Capital Studies,

John RobertsonJohn Robertson, a vice president and senior economist in the Atlanta Fed's research department, and

Ellyn TerryEllyn Terry, a senior economic analyst in the Atlanta Fed's research department

April 10, 2014 in Business Cycles, Employment, Labor Markets | Permalink

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have you considered that a number of people will say they dont want a job because they have experienced repeated frustration in finding one? it's better for one's psyche to lie to yourself and to others about such than to accept the fact that one has repeatedly been rejected...

Posted by: rjs | April 10, 2014 at 04:39 PM

Astonishing decline in male labor force participation since 1970s.

I would be interested to see more detailed age bracket than category of the 25 - 54 age brackets.

This is so we can see if the decline over time is consistent for all ages or the particular works from certain age that flows through remainder of their working life.

Jason

Posted by: Jason | April 12, 2014 at 10:21 PM

Clearly there is nobody who is unemployed who does not want a job. This article is simply a deceptive representation of the facts. The problem is largely that employers will not hire qualified people unless they have done the exact same job before. They will not for example hire an Architect to work as a project manager at a company that manufactures windows, because the HR people use IT to scan the resumes in place of interviews and will only choose from the set of people who have been employed by manufacturers of windows in the past.

Do the survey and the research over again and ask the right questions. The problem more than likely is that the most qualified people are being overlooked, are frustrated because they can,t crossover to a different industry or are victims of age discrimination. You can be certain that most people want to have a job. Sop, dig deeper.

Posted by: Terry L. Walker, ARCHITECT | April 14, 2014 at 11:01 AM

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April 08, 2014

A Closer Look at Post-2007 Labor Force Participation Trends

Introduction
The rate of labor force participation (the share of the civilian noninstitutionalized population aged 16 and older in the labor force) has declined significantly since 2007. To what extent were the Great Recession and tepid recovery responsible?

In this post and one that will follow, we offer a series of charts using data from the Current Population Survey to explore some of the possible reasons behind the 2007–13 drop in participation. This first post describes the impact of the changing-age composition of the population and changes in labor force participation within specific age cohorts—see Calculated Risk posts here and here for a related treatment, and also this recent BLS study. The next post will look at the issue of potential cyclical impacts on participation by examining the behavior of the prime-age population.

Putting the decline in context
After rising from the mid-1960s through 1990, the overall labor force participation rate was relatively stable between 1990 and 2007. But participation has declined sharply since 2007. By 2013, participation was at the lowest level since 1978 (see chart 1).

140407_1

For men, the longer-term declining trend of participation accelerated after 2007. For women, after having been relatively stable since the late 1990s, participation began to decline after 2009. The decline for both males and females since 2009 was similar (see chart 2).

140407_2

The impact of retirement
One of the most important features of labor force participation is that it varies considerably over the life cycle: the rate of participation is low among young individuals, peaks during the prime-age years of 25 to 54, and then declines (see chart 3). So a change in the age distribution of the population can result in a significant change in overall labor force participation.

140407_3

The age distribution of the population has been shifting outward for some time. This is a result of the so-called baby boomer generation—that is, people born between 1946 and 1964 (see chart 4). The oldest baby boomers turned 62 in 2008 and became eligible for Social Security retirement benefits.

140407_4

At the same time the age distribution of the population has shifted out, the rate of retirement of older Americans has been declining. Retirement rates have generally been drifting down since the early 2000s (see chart 5). The decline in age-specific retirement rates has resulted in rising age-specific labor force participation rates. For example, from 1999 to 2013, the share of 62-year-old retirees declined from 38 percent to 28 percent. The BLS projects that this trend will continue at a similar pace in coming years (see table 3 of the BLS report).

140407_5

Although the decline in the propensity to retire has put some upward pressure on overall labor force participation, that effect is dominated by the sheer increase in the number of people reaching retirement age. The net result has been a steep rise in the share of the population saying they are not in the labor force because they are retired (see chart 6).

140407_6

Participation by age group
Individuals aged 16–24
The labor force participation rate for young individuals (between 16 and 24 years old) has been generally declining since the late 1990s. After slowing in the mid-2000s, the decline accelerated again during the Great Recession. However, participation has been relatively stable since 2009 (see chart 7). Nonetheless, the BLS projects that the participation rate for 16- to 24-year-olds will decline further, albeit at a slower pace than it declined between 2000 and 2009, and will fall a little below 50 percent by 2022.

140407_7

The change in participation among young people can be attributed almost entirely to enrollment rates in education programs (see here) and lower labor force participation among enrollees (see chart 8). The change in the share of 16- to 24-year-olds who say they don't currently want a job because they are in school closely matches the change in labor force participation for the entire cohort.

140407_8

Individuals aged 25–54 (prime age)
Generally, people aged 25 to 54 are the group most likely to be participating in the labor market (see chart 3). These so-called prime-age individuals are less likely to be making retirement decisions than older individuals, and less likely to be enrolled in schooling or training than younger individuals.

However, the prime-age labor force participation rate declined considerably between 2007 and 2013, and at a much faster pace than had been seen in the years prior to the recession (see chart 9). Reflective of the overall gender-specific participation differences seen in chart 2, the decline in prime-age female participation did not take hold until after 2009, and since 2009 the decline in both prime-age male and female participation has been quite similar. Nevertheless, the BLS projects that prime-age participation will stabilize in coming years and prime-age participation in 2022 will be close to its 2013 level.

140407_9

Implications
The BLS projects that participation by age group will look like this in 2022 relative to 2013 (see chart 10).

140407_10

Participation by youths is projected to continue to fall. The participation of older workers is projected to increase, but it will remain significantly lower than that of the prime-age group. Combined with an age distribution that has also continued to shift outward (see chart 11), the overall participation rate is expected to decline over the next several years from its 2013 level of around 63.3 percent. From the BLS study:

A combination of demographic, structural, and cyclical factors has affected the overall labor force participation rate, as well as the participation rates of specific groups, in the past. BLS projects that, as has been the case for the last 10 years or so, these factors will exert downward pressure on the overall labor force participation rate over the 2012–2022 period and the rate will gradually decline further, to 61.6 percent in 2022.

140407_11

However, an important assumption in the BLS projection is that the post-2007 decline in prime-age participation will not persist. Indeed, the data for the first quarter of 2014 does suggest that some stabilization has occurred.

But separating what is trend from what is cyclical is challenging. The rapid pace of the decline in participation among the prime-age population between 2007 and 2013 is somewhat puzzling. Could this decline reflect a temporary cyclical effect or something more permanent? A follow-up blog will explore this question in more detail using the micro data from the Current Population Survey.

Note: All data shown are 12-month moving averages to emphasize persistent shifts in trends.

 

Melinda PittsBy Melinda Pitts, director, Center for Human Capital Studies,

John RobertsonJohn Robertson, a vice president and senior economist in the Atlanta Fed's research department, and

Ellyn TerryEllyn Terry, a senior economic analyst in the Atlanta Fed's research department

April 8, 2014 in Business Cycles, Employment, Unemployment | Permalink

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September 26, 2013

The New Normal? Slower R&D Spending

In case you need more to worry about, try this: the pace of research and development (R&D) spending has slowed. The National Science Foundation defines R&D as “creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge” and application of this knowledge toward new applications. (The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) used to treat R&D as an intermediate input in current production. But the latest benchmark revision of the national accounts recorded R&D spending as business investment expenditure. See here for an interesting implication of this change.)

The following chart shows the BEA data on total real private R&D investment spending (purchased or performed on own-account) over the last 50 years, on a year-over-year percent change basis. (For a snapshot of R&D spending across states in 2007, see here.)

Real Spending on Research and Development


Notice the unusually slow pace of R&D spending in recent years. The 50-year average is 4.6 percent. The average over the last 5 years is 1.1 percent. This slower pace of spending has potentially important implications for overall productivity growth, which has also been below historic norms in recent years.

R&D spending is often cited as an important source of productivity growth within a firm, especially in terms of product innovation. But R&D is also an inherently risky endeavor, since the outcome is quite uncertain. So to the extent that economic and policy uncertainty has helped make businesses more cautious in recent years, a slow pace of R&D spending is not surprising. On top of that, the federal funding of R&D activity remains under significant budget pressure. See, for example, here.

So you can add R&D spending to the list of things that seem to be moving more slowly than normal. Or should we think of it as normal?

Photo of John RobertsonBy John Robertson, vice president and senior economist in the Atlanta Fed’s research department


September 26, 2013 in Business Cycles, Capital and Investment, Productivity | Permalink

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As someone who has spent many years in corporate R&D, I think I would advise some caution in interpreting these numbers. My experience is that an enormous amount of corporate R&D spending is simply wasted, essentially through poor management (alternatively just the fact that managing R&D from ideation through to product creation and monetization is really a very difficult task).

So it's possible that a gradual fall in overall R&D expenditure, especially relative to its natural variability, could actually reflect a healthy re-balancing of corporate spending, either through improved research productivity or through a shift towards more product-oriented expenditures. Without a lot more analysis it's difficult to really assess what's going on here.

Posted by: Mark Thomson (@markmthomson) | September 26, 2013 at 05:43 PM

Do these data include expenditures at universities? Maybe it's a low share. But as a public good every state has an incentive to let someone else provide elite higher education (as they're the most mobile geographically) and R&D.

Posted by: mike smitka | October 03, 2013 at 02:03 PM

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December 16, 2011

Maybe this time was at least a little different?

Earlier this week, Derek Thomson, a senior editor at The Atlantic, began his article "The Graph That Proves Economic Forecasters Are Almost Always Wrong" with some observations that don't really require a graph:

"As the saying goes: 'It's hard to make predictions. Especially about the future.' Thirty years ago, it was obvious to everybody that oil prices would keep going up forever. Twenty years ago, it was obvious that Japan would own the 21st century. Ten years ago, it was obvious that our economic stewards had mastered a kind of thermostatic control over business cycles to prevent great recessions. We were wrong, wrong, and wrong."

In a recent speech, Dennis Lockhart—whom most of you recognize as president here at the Atlanta Fed—offered his own thoughts on why forecasts can go so wrong:

"… you may wonder why forecasters, the Fed included, don't do a better job. To answer this question, let me suggest three reasons why forecasts may be off.

"While it's relatively trivial in my view, the first reason involves missing the timing of economic activity. An example of that was mentioned earlier when I explained that GDP for the third quarter had been revised down while the fourth quarter is expected to compensate.

"A second reason that forecasts miss the mark is, in everyday language, stuff happens.

"To be a little more precise, unforeseen developments are a fact of life. In my view, the energy and commodity shocks early in the year had a significant impact on growth in the first half of 2011. The tsunami-related supply disruptions, though temporary, were an exacerbating factor. In fact, a lot of shocks or disruptions are quite temporary and don't cause one to rethink the narrative about where the economy is likely going.

"Which brings me to the third reason why economic prognostications go off track: we, as forecasters, simply get the bigger story wrong.

"What I mean by getting the bigger story wrong is failing to understand the fundamentals at work in the economy."

"Getting the bigger story wrong" is Simon Potter's theme in the New York Fed's Liberty Street Economics blog post, "The Failure to Forecast the Great Recession":

"Looking through our briefing materials and other sources such as New York Fed staff reports reveals that the Bank's economic research staff, like most other economists, were behind the curve as the financial crisis developed, even though many of our economists made important contributions to the understanding of the crisis. Three main failures in our real-time forecasting stand out:

1.  Misunderstanding of the housing boom …

2. A lack of analysis of the rapid growth of new forms of mortgage finance …

3. Insufficient weight given to the powerful adverse feedback loops between the financial system and the real economy …


"However, the biggest failure was the complacency resulting from the apparent ease of maintaining financial and economic stability during the Great Moderation."

Potter does not implicate any of his Federal Reserve brethren, but you can add me to the roll call of those having made each of the mistakes on the list.

Should we have known? A powerful narrative that we should have has taken hold. The boom-bust cycle associated with large bouts of asset appreciation and debt accumulation has a long history in economics, and the theme has been pressed home in its most recent incarnation by the work of Carmen Reinhart and coauthors, including the highly influential book written with Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.

Unfortunately, even seemingly compelling historical evidence is not always so clear cut. An illustration of this, relevant to the failure to forecast the Great Recession, was provided in a paper by Enrique Mendoza and Marco Terrones (from the University of Maryland and the International Monetary Fund, respectively), presented last month at a Central Bank of Chile conference, "Capital Mobility and Monetary Policy." What the paper puts forward is described by Mendoza and Terrones as follows:

"… in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) we proposed a new methodology for measuring and identifying credit booms and showed that it was successful in identifying credit boom events with a clear cyclical pattern in both macro and micro data.

"The method we proposed is a 'thresholds method.' This method works by first splitting real credit per capita in each country into its cyclical and trend components, and then identifying a credit boom as an episode in which credit exceeds its long-run trend by more than a given 'boom' threshold, defined in terms of a tail probability event… The key defining feature of this method is that the thresholds are proportional to each country's standard deviation of credit over the business cycle. Hence, credit booms reflect 'unusually large' cyclical credit expansions."

And here is what they find:

"In this paper, we apply this method to data for 61 countries (21 industrialized countries, ICs, and 40 emerging market economies, EMs), over the 1960-2010 period. We found a total of 70 credit booms, 35 in ICs and 35 in EMs, including 16 credit booms that peaked in the critical period surrounding the recent financial crisis between 2007 and 2010 (again with about half of these recent booms in ICs and EMs each)…

"The results show that credit booms are associated with periods of economic expansion, rising equity and housing prices, real appreciation and widening external deficits in the upswing of the booms, followed by the opposite dynamics in the downswing."

That certainly sounds familiar, and supports the "we should have known" meme. But the full facts are a little trickier. Mendoza and Terrones continue:

"A major deviation in the evidence reported here relative to our previous findings in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) is that adding the data from the recent credit booms and crisis we find that in fact credit booms in ICs and EMs are more similar than different. In contrast, in our earlier work we found differences in the magnitudes of credit booms, the size of the macroeconomic fluctuations associated with credit booms, and the likelihood that they are followed by banking or currency crises.

"… while not all credit booms end in crisis, the peaks of credit booms are often followed by banking crises, currency crises of Sudden Stops, and the frequency with which this happens is about the same for EMs and ICs (20 to 25 percent for banking and currency for banking crisis, 14 percent for Sudden Stops)."

Their notion still supports the case of the "we should have known" camp, but here's the rub (emphasis mine):

"This is a critical change from our previous findings, because lacking substantial evidence from all the recent booms and crises, we had found only 9 percent frequency of banking crises after credit booms for EMs and zero for ICs, and 14 percent frequency of currency crises after credit booms for EMs v. 31 percent for ICs."

In other words, based on this particular evidence, we should have been looking for a run on the dollar, not a banking crisis. What we got, of course, was pretty much the opposite.

No excuses here. Speaking only for myself, I had the story wrong. But the conclusion to that story is a lot clearer now than it was in the middle of the tale.

David AltigBy Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

 

December 16, 2011 in Business Cycles, Financial System, Forecasts | Permalink

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When your currency is the global reserve currency, there is nothing
available in sufficient size to run TO. Therefore, a run ON the dollar
was an impossibility. The ONLY other possibility was the only one remaining, a run on the Banking System.

Posted by: Robert K | December 18, 2011 at 01:13 PM

Indeed, you can't predict economic events. No kidding.

However, that fact means you must also give up attempts to control the economy.

If you cannot predict any future, how do you navigate to one particular desired future?

There is no actual evidence over 50-year periods that any country has successfully done so. Economists have destroyed a lot of countries in their attempts, however.

Abolish the Fed.

Posted by: Lew Glendenning | December 18, 2011 at 08:51 PM

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August 26, 2011

Lots of ground to cover: An update

If you have to discuss a difficult circumstance, I guess Jackson Hole, Wyo., is as nice as place as any to do so. This morning, as most folks know by now, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke reiterated the reason that most Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members support the expectation that policy rates will remain low for the next couple of years:

"In light of its current outlook, the Committee recently decided to provide more specific forward guidance about its expectations for the future path of the federal funds rate. In particular, in the statement following our meeting earlier this month, we indicated that economic conditions—including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run—are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013. That is, in what the Committee judges to be the most likely scenarios for resource utilization and inflation in the medium term, the target for the federal funds rate would be held at its current low levels for at least two more years."

There are two pieces of information that emphasize the economy's recent weakness and potential slow growth going forward. The first is this week's revised forecasts and potential for gross domestic product (GDP) from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the second is today's revision of second quarter GDP from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Though estimates of potential GDP have not greatly changed, the CBO's downgrade in forecasts and BEA's report of much lower than potential growth in the second quarter have the current and prospective rates of resource utilization lower than when macroblog covered the issue just about a month ago.

Key to the CBO's estimates is a reasonably good outlook for GDP growth after we get past 2012:

"For the 2013–2016 period, CBO projects that real GDP will grow by an average of 3.6 percent a year, considerably faster than potential output. That growth will bring the economy to a high rate of resource use (that is, completely close the gap between the economy's actual and potential output) by 2017."

The margin for slippage, though, is not great. Assuming that GDP ends 2011 having grown by about 2.3 percent—as projected by the CBO—here's a look at gaps between actual and potential GDP for different, seemingly plausible growth rates:


Attaining 3.5 percent growth by next year moves the CBO's date for closing the output gap up by about a year. On the other hand, a fall in output growth to an average of 3 percent per year moves the date for eliminating resource slack back to 2020. If growth remains below that—well, let's hope it doesn't.

David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

 

August 26, 2011 in Business Cycles, Economic Growth and Development, Employment, Forecasts, Saving, Capital, and Investment | Permalink

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«economic conditions—including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run—are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.»

The exceptionally low funding rates to financial intermediaries are not resulting in equally low rates for customers of those intermediaries, because the Fed has repeatedly hinted that they want to rebuild the balance sheet of the finance sector boosting their profits by granting them a huge spread (and hoping that at least half of those profits go into capital instead of bonuses).

Bernanke's statement then may be interpreted as saying that the Fed does expects the financial sector to need another several years of extra profits resulting from the Fed "subsidy" because the finance sector seem unlikely to be able to make any profit if market conditions prevailed, and indeed it seems that the capital position of many finance sector "national champions" is still weak considering the cosmetically hidden capital losses they have.

As to inflation, wage inflation is indeed well contained (wages are declining in real terms) even if cost of living inflation seems pretty rampant; in a similar country like the UK where indices are less "massaged" the RPI has been running at over 5% and on an increasing trend:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14538167

Posted by: Blissex | August 26, 2011 at 05:28 PM

Why can't the Federal Reserve tell the public the obvious: Growth will only come about by hiring people with livable wages.

If we don't raise incomes nationally we will be forced to liquidate on a massive scale. It doesn't matter who does the hiring, just that it is done.

It isn't the deficit. It isn't the debt. It's the incomes, stupid.

Posted by: beezer | August 27, 2011 at 06:10 AM

Ken Rogoff says 3-5 years of 1-2% GDP and Carmen Reinhart thinks 5-6 years of 2%. =(

Posted by: DarkLayers | August 27, 2011 at 11:19 PM

In terms of econometrics, annual increment of real GDP per capita is constant over time http://mechonomic.blogspot.com/2011/08/revised-gdp-estimates-support-model-of.html . Therefore, the rate of real GDP per capita growth has to decay as a reciprocal function of the attained level of GDP per capita. The exponential component in the overall GDP is fully related to population growth which has been around 1% per year in the U.S. Currently, the rate of population growth falls and the trajectory of the overall GDP lags behind the projection which includes 1% population growth. If to look at the per head estimates, there is no gap between "potential" and observed levels.
In no case should an economist mix the growth in population and real economic growth.

Posted by: kio | August 28, 2011 at 04:03 AM

It's going to be a long time. Do you know how hard it will be for a person to live in the same town for 30 years?

Our money game will need new rules because 30 years at the same job/house/town is over.

But once that issue is fixed, watch out. Technologically America is so far ahead that earning a 100k(todays $$) salary can be done in 6 months.

To keep the NYC banks from leeching on it will be a task.

Posted by: FormerSSResident | August 31, 2011 at 07:00 PM

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August 15, 2011

The GDP revisions: What changed?

Prior to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis's (BEA) benchmark gross domestic product (GDP) revisions announced three Fridays ago, we were devoting a fair amount of space—here, in particular—to picking apart some of the patterns in the data over the course of the recovery. Ahh, the best-laid plans. As noted in a speech today from Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart:

"It's been an eventful two weeks, to say the least. Let's now look ahead. The $64,000 question is what's the outlook from here?...


"Whether we're seeing a temporary soft patch in an otherwise gradually improving growth picture or a deeper and more persistent slowdown, most of the arriving economic data lately have caused forecasters to write down their projections. Also, and importantly, the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Department of Commerce has revised earlier economic growth numbers. These revisions paint a different picture of the depth of the recession and the relative strength of the recovery."


Beyond keeping the record straight, revisiting the charts from our previous posts in light of the new GDP data is a key input into answering President Lockhart's $64,000 question. Here, then, is that story, at least in part.

1. Even ignoring the depth of the recession, the first two years of this recovery have been slow relative to the early phases of the past two recoveries.

I wasn't so sure this was the case to be made prior to the new statistics from the BEA, but the revisions made clear that, while still broadly similar to the slower growth pattern of the prior two recoveries, the GDP performance has been pretty easily the slowest of all.

Real GDP

2. Consumption growth has been especially weak in this recovery, and the pattern of consumer spending has been more concentrated in consumer durables than has been the case in prior business cycles.

Change in consumption expenditures

The consumer spending piece of this puzzle has President Lockhart's attention:

"I'm most concerned about the effect of the wild stock market on consumer spending. Volatility alone could have a negative impact on consumer psychology at a time of already weakening spending. Last Friday, it was reported that the University of Michigan's Survey of Consumer Sentiment fell sharply in early August to its lowest level in more than 30 years. Furthermore, if the loss of stock market value persists, the effect from the loss of investment value could combine with the loss of value in home prices to discourage consumers more and longer."


On the bright side, the GDP revisions did not of themselves alter the household spending picture. Though the benchmark revisions contained significant changes in consumer spending, those changes were concentrated during the recession in 2008 and 2009. Personal consumption expenditures were actually revised upward from 2009 on, with the big negative changes coming in net exports and government spending:

GDP revisions

Are there other rays of hope? I might add this:

3. The revisions show that the momentum that seemed to fade through 2010 was more apparent in total GDP than in final demand. In other words, the basic storyline—a good start to 2010 with a soft patch in the middle and a stronger finish—still emerges if you look through changes in inventories.

Pattern of final demand

That observation does not, of course, help salve the pain of the very anemic first half of this year. Nonetheless (from Lockhart, again):

"At the Atlanta Fed, we have revised down our near and intermediate gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecast, but we are holding to the view that the economy will continue to grow at a very modest pace. In other words, we do not expect the onset of outright contraction—a recession—but I have to say the risk of recession is higher than we perceived a month or two ago...


"The rapid-fire developments of the last several days, along with some troubling data releases, have shaken confidence. People are worried. Investors, Main Street businessmen and women, and consumers are wondering which way things will tip. The public—and for that matter, policymakers—are operating in a fog of uncertainty that is thicker than normal."


That fog of uncertainty was made thicker by the GDP revisions, and thicker yet by the volatility that followed. But I would still pass along this advice from President Lockhart:

"At this juncture, we should not jump to conclusions. A clearer picture of economic reality will be revealed in time as immediate uncertainties dissipate. It's premature, in my view, to declare these important questions relating to our economic future settled."


David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

August 15, 2011 in Business Cycles, Economic Growth and Development, Forecasts, Saving, Capital, and Investment | Permalink

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I think it is important to remember that the BEA only has comprehensive data on income and consumer spending in 2009 and earlier. With this annual revision they folded in mandatory census like surveys on retail trade and services. On the income side they incorporated IRS tax return data which led to substantially lower estimates of asset income. Data from the Michigan survey suggests that the current estimates of personal income in 2010 and later might be overstated. The BEA does a very important job as best they can, but the source data is slow to roll in. We probably have a good picture of the recession now, but the recovery is still a work in progress in the NIPAs. In my opinion, if you want to understand the slow recovery in consumer spending...look at the income expectations (or lack thereof) in the Michigan survey.

Posted by: Claudia Sahm | August 16, 2011 at 04:48 AM

Interesting, as always. I'd like to see point 2 done for fixed investment, too.

Posted by: Dave Backus | August 16, 2011 at 05:37 PM

I think we should not begin to accept the pace of recovery in the last two recessions as a "new normal." The last two recessions have featured very little fiscal stimulus, and increasing emphasis on monetary means. Also, what fiscal stimulus there has been is of dubious value, particularly some of the tax policy measures.

These observations reflect a transition from a political economic theory that government spending should fill the gap created by falling consumer and business spending during times of recession to a political economic theory based accounting (i.e., that spending should not exceed revenues). The latter is leading to larger and larger output gaps, and will eventually lead to permanent recession.

This is why it should not be accepted as the "new normal."

Posted by: Charles | August 17, 2011 at 11:02 AM

Looks like the market is now firmly the master. Everybody has become an economist, we elect an Economist for Governors and Presidents, because we have lost control. The Tea Party is a reaction to this, a desperate one.

If the Fed/America can't re-gain control, someone else will.

Posted by: FormerSSresident | August 17, 2011 at 01:43 PM

Inventories are no longer helping and government will be a drag. It is difficult to see where growth comes from in this environment.
We should measure private sector GDP (without Government) as it is the engine that must support the economy and the government.
The economy has been off track for some 15 years as consumer debt has been the engine and that source is over. Debt is a burden and it should not be used for basic consumption or stimulus. All it does is remove future growth. We are in for a sustained period of slow growth.

Posted by: GASinclair | August 19, 2011 at 06:25 PM

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August 01, 2011

Is the economy hitting stall speed?

The news that the U.S. economy is not only growing slowly but has grown more slowly than anyone even knew has justifiably rattled some nerves. The sentiment is captured well enough by this article from Bloomberg:

"The world's largest economy has yet to regain the ground it lost during the recession and may be vulnerable to a relapse.


"Gross domestic product [GDP] expanded at a 1.3 percent annual rate in the second quarter, after a 0.4 percent pace in the prior period, the worst six months since the recovery began in June 2009, Commerce Department figures showed yesterday. Economists said the slowdown leaves the recovery susceptible to being knocked off course by shocks at home or abroad."


At Reuters, James Pethokoukis makes those concerns quantitative:

"...we're in the danger zone for another recession. Research from the Federal Reserve finds that that since 1947, when two-quarter annualized real GDP growth falls below 2 percent, recession follows within a year 48 percent of the time. (And when year-over-year real GDP growth falls below 2 percent, recession follows within a year 70 percent of the time.")


The research being referred to is work done by the Federal Reserve Board's Jeremy Nalewaik, a careful researcher who is clear that the results should be read with, well, care.

"The dynamics at play in the early part of the 1990s and 2000s expansions may have been different than the dynamics at play in the more-mature part of those and other expansions, and our stall speed models may have omitted an additional phase of the business cycle that has appeared in recent decades, namely the sluggish, jobless recovery phase. If so, the applicability of these stall speed models may be somewhat limited at certain times, such as in the middle of 2010 when the economy evidently slowed while still in the early stages of recovery from the 2007-9 recession."


With caveats like that in mind, Dennis Lockhart, the president of the Atlanta Fed, counseled patience in a speech he delivered on Friday:

"My staff and I have recently been pondering the following questions: Are we experiencing a temporary slowdown—a soft patch—on a recovery path that should return to a rate of 3 to 4 percent GDP growth? Or, instead, are we dealing with an inherently slower pace of economic growth that, because of some combination of persistent economic headwinds and deeper structural adjustment requirements, has the potential to be of much longer duration and more intractable?"


Lockhart said his base case forecast is in line with the greater-strength view.

"I am expecting greater strength in the second half of 2011 and into 2012, accompanied by inflation numbers that converge to around 2 percent. But, as I said, I don't dismiss the possibility that we're in the alternative, more problematic world I described of low and slow growth improving only very gradually. At this juncture, I think we have to wait and see what the incoming data indicate...


"But to try to put some time limit on indecision, I think a continuing flow of weak numbers through the third quarter and into the fourth will call for a serious reconsideration of the situation. The weight of cumulative data could point to a different order of problem—that is, different than just a passing slowdown—if indicators show continued weakness much past year's end."


Of course, Nalewaik's research shows that things could become considerably less comfortable if the 2 percent threshold persists, or the yield curve flattens, or the housing market tanks again. At that point, history is on the side of the recessionists. While Lockhart and our Reserve Bank don't believe we're there yet, it's fair to say we'd feel more comfortable if the incoming third quarter data were a little more positive. And on that count, this morning's Institute for Supply Management report for manufacturing isn't a very promising first step.

David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director, and



Mike Bryan Mike Bryan, vice president and senior economist, both of the Atlanta Fed

August 1, 2011 in Business Cycles, Data Releases, Economic Growth and Development, Employment | Permalink

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I think a problem with the US economy these days is the amount of debt and leverage involved in all markets. Even if you're not highly leveraged yourself, you can bet most of the other market participants will be, and that makes for an unstable investment (through no fault of your own) when the global economy has another dip and all asset classes get the jitters.

My biggest fear as an investor right now would be China. A drop in Chinese asset values would not only shake confidence in China's economic vitality, but it would also open debate about whether or not the global economy is over-leveraged and over-reliant on the success of China (it is).

Excessive leverage is partly what made the property bubble aftermath so devastating for Japan, America and Ireland. There's a lot of talk about the Chinese economic bubble and it's potential impact on the global economy. Several months ago, so-called Chinese 'expert' Nick Lardy dismissed worries about what he called the "so-called property bubble" - this was during a conference held at Peterson Institute in DC. However, he now concedes that says a real estate downturn may cause a significant in China, and this is an opinion shared by many other mainstream economic analysts.......

So what changed his opinion? I would suggest a dawning realisation that most of the massive Chinese stimulus, lending and spending during 2009/10 just ended up in property purchases, which drove real estate prices in an alarming and totally unsustainable manner. Also, a realisation that China's economic system frequently produces bubbles, and that's not very likely to change in the near future!!

To understand why excessive debt and leverage is going to have a hugely negative impact on all asset classes going forward, read up on some of the work by Professor Steve Keen (see http://australianpropertyforum.com/blog/main/3567572 ). He's the Australian guy who predicted the GFC, and he has also shown that unsustainable debt to GDP ratios in a country (which you definitely have in the USA, and we have in Australia too) will always result in deflation or depression.

Charles B.

Posted by: Charles Bandridge | August 02, 2011 at 08:26 PM

Hi Dave & Mike, I pop in occasionally but haven't felt the need to kibitz, but I'm lost over what the FED has left in its bag. But first, the working world, at least those in the private sector are way beyond needing to know why "excessive debt & leverage is going to have a hugely negative impact on them". They've been living it for five years, since their spiggots were closed.
My question is, has the FED been largely rendered helpless to turn the mess around that it was so much involved in creating? I'll be the first to admit, I don't know a lot (although I spent many months barking warnings of the impending mortgage implosion), but my guesses are: a QE3 will be toothless & the housing bear market has years to go. So, what's left to encourage Banks to lend & buyers to borrow?

Posted by: bailey | August 10, 2011 at 10:30 PM

Let me toss out what the FED can do to encourage Banks to lend - make it more costly for them NOT to lend. Unfortunately, that raises a better question - if the FED works for the Banks, is it really in its best interest to act to constrain Banks profit?
So, maybe the question is best left to Congress? Oops, isn't that what got us here.

Posted by: bailey | August 14, 2011 at 08:42 AM

Understanding that when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, I still find it mystifying how monetary policy can be expected to alter business fundamentals by anyone with an ounce of sense, except in illusory ways such as via inflation.

I've never seen an answer to the question whether the US economy can grow at what is considered "reasonable" rates without the aid of a housing bubble, an internet bubble, a finance bubble, or some new kind of bubble, when US wages are being driven down by globalization and costs of production are being driven up by global growth in oil consumption. Unless we can accelerate conversion to natural gas and ultimately renewable energy, this contraction seems likely to last for a long time.

Posted by: George McKee | August 14, 2011 at 07:21 PM

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July 28, 2011

Lots of ground to cover

In my last post I noted that the pace of the recovery, now two years old, is in broad terms similar to that of the first two years of the previous two recoveries. The set-up included this observation:

"Though we have grown used to thinking of the rebound from the most recent recession as being spectacularly substandard, that impression (which I share) is driven more by the depth of the downturn than the actual speed of the recovery."

The context of the depth of the downturn is not, of course, irrelevant. One way of quantifying that context is to look at measures of the "output gap," that is, the difference between the level of real gross domestic product (GDP) and the economy's "potential." An informal way to think about whether or not a recovery is complete is to mark the time when the output gap returns to zero, or when the level of GDP returns to its potential.

There are several ways to estimate potential GDP, but for my money the one constructed by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is as good as any. And it does not tell a pretty story:

Real GDP-Real Potential GDP

It is worth noting that the CBO's measure is not a just a simple extrapolation of a constant trend, but a calculation based on historical relationships among labor hours, productivity growth, unemployment, and inflation. Their trend in potential GDP growth rates implied by this methodology, described here, is anything but linear:

Real Potential GDP

Note that the output gaps in the first chart are at historical lows (by a lot) despite the fact that potential GDP growth is at historical lows as well.

These estimates provide one way to assess the pace of the recovery. For example, the midpoints of the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) most recent consensus forecasts for GDP growth are 2.8 percent (2011), 3.5 percent (2012), and 3.85 percent (2013). If those forecasts come to pass, approximately 60 percent of the CBO-implied gap will be closed. This would still leave, in real terms, more resource slack than existed at the lowest point in the past two recessions.

Put another way, if the economy grows at 4 percent from 2012 forward, the output gap won't be closed until sometime in 2015. At a growth rate of 3.5 percent—the lower end of FOMC participants' projections for the next two years—the "full recovery" date gets pushed back to 2016. If, however, the FOMC projections are too optimistic and the economy can only manage to grow at an annual pace of 3 percent (which is currently the consensus view of private forecasters for 2012) output gaps persist until 2020.

The conventional view of the macroeconomy that motivates the CBO estimates of potential GDP (and hence output gaps) at least implicitly embeds the assumption that time heals all wound. But the healing won't necessarily be fast.

David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

July 28, 2011 in Business Cycles, Economic Growth and Development, Employment, Forecasts, Saving, Capital, and Investment | Permalink

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July 20, 2011

Is consumer spending the problem?

In answer to the question posed in the title to this post, The New York Times's David Leonhardt says absolutely:

"There is no shortage of explanations for the economy's maddening inability to leave behind the Great Recession and start adding large numbers of jobs…

"But the real culprit—or at least the main one—has been hiding in plain sight. We are living through a tremendous bust. It isn't simply a housing bust. It's a fizzling of the great consumer bubble that was decades in the making…

"If you're looking for one overarching explanation for the still-terrible job market, it is this great consumer bust."

Tempting story, but is the explanation for "the still-terrible job market" that simple?

First, some perspective on the pace of the current recovery. Though we have grown used to thinking of the rebound from the most recent recession as being spectacularly substandard, that impression (which I share) is driven more by the depth of the downturn than the actual speed of the recovery. The following chart traces the path of real gross domestic product (GDP) from the trough of the last three recessions:


In the first two years following the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions, output grew by about 6 percent. Assuming that GDP grew at annual rate of 1.5 percent in the second quarter just ended—a not-unreasonable guess at this point—the economy will have expanded by about 5.3 percent since the end of the last recession in July 2009. That's not a difference that jumps off the page at me.

Directly to the point of consumption spending, it is certainly true that consumer spending has expanded at a slower pace in the expansion to this point than was the case at the same point in the recoveries following the previous two recessions. From the end of the recession in the second quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of this year (we won't have the first official look at this year's second quarter until next week), personal consumption expenditures grew in real terms by just under 4 percent. That growth compares to 4.8 percent in the first seven quarters following the end of the 2001 recession and 5.9 percent in the first seven quarters following the end of the 1990–91 recession.

That difference in the growth of consumption across the early quarters of recovery after the 1990–91 and 2001 recessions with little discernible difference in GDP growth across those episodes illustrates the pitfalls of mechanically focusing on specific categories of spending. In fact, the relatively slower pace of consumer spending in this expansion has in part been compensated by a relatively high pace of business spending on equipment and software:


If you throw consumer durables into the general notion of "investment" (investment in this case for home production) the story of this recovery is the relative boom in capital spending compared to recent recoveries:


And what about that "still-terrible job market"? You won't get much argument from me about that description, but here again the reality is complicated. Focusing once more on the period since the end of the recession, the pace of job creation is not out of sync in comparison to recent expansions (though job creation after the last two recessions was meager as well, and we are, of course, starting from a much bigger hole in terms of jobs lost):


So, relative to recent experience, at this point in the recovery GDP growth and employment growth are about average (if we ignore the size of the recession in both measures). The undeniable (and relevant) human toll aside, the current recovery seems so disappointing because we expect the pace of the recovery to bear some relationship to the depth of the downturn. That expectation, in turn, comes from a view of the world in which potential output proceeds in a more or less linear fashion, up and to the right. But what if that view is wrong and our potential is a sequence of more or less permanent "jumps" up and down, some of which are small and some of which are big?

In addition, investment growth to date has been strong relative to recent recoveries and, as Leonhardt suggests, consumption growth has been somewhat weak. So here's a question: Would we have had more job creation and stronger GDP growth had businesses been more inclined to add workers instead of capital? And if that had occurred, might the consumption numbers have been considerably stronger?

David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

 

July 20, 2011 in Business Cycles, Economic Growth and Development, Employment, Forecasts, Saving, Capital, and Investment | Permalink

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This is an excellent contribution to elevating the quality of commentary on the current expansion. It is time to recognize the cycles experienced in the 60s, 70s, and early 80s were fundamentally different from those since. Because of this, the earlier cycles are not part of the relevant benchmark for making comparisons to current behavior. Three cheers for taking them out of the baseline used for comparisons.

Posted by: Douglas Lee | July 21, 2011 at 10:22 AM

David,
Let me ask a supplemental question. Following the '91 recession, the US created something like 20mm jobs. Following the '01 recession, perhaps 8.5mm jobs were created. How many jobs will be created in this decade?
Stewart

Posted by: stewart sprague | July 21, 2011 at 10:40 AM

The payroll employment chart suggests that just looking at the path for the level of employment from the end of a recession is not the relevant metric. How about looking at net jobs lost during the recession versus net jobs regained during the recovery? Then, the metric captures the essence of what the graph should indicate -- and what the blog offers in words. That the immense job loss of the recent recession is the big difference, and the recent sluggish job creation is akin to recoveries in 1991 and 2001. From this perspective, we have a problem that has been around for a few business cycles.

Posted by: ET_OC | July 21, 2011 at 02:44 PM

The obvious deficiencies in GDP this time have been net exports and government spending.

While the Fed has done its best to promote both, the politicians in Washington have done their best in the opposite direction by promoting an over-valued dollar and reduced federal spending, despite interest rates on the federal debt that are universally lower than during the years of the federal budget surplus.

Posted by: Paul | July 21, 2011 at 04:19 PM

I find it highly annoying that the the obvious is invisible to everyone.

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CMDEBT

Households were pulling $1.2T/yr of new mortgage debt during the boom 2004-2006. This was all cut off in 2007-2008.

Corporate debt take-on was another $800B/yr during this time, for a $2T/yr stimulus to the economy.

THAT IS TWENTY MILLION $100k/yr jobs!

Previous recessions in my life were all prompted by the Fed raising interest rates to throttle debt growth. What killed debt growth this time was the collapse of the ponzi lending structure and the bubble machine it was powering.

Posted by: Troy | July 22, 2011 at 01:58 AM

If you look at percent job losses since peak employment (not only since end of recession), then you can see how bad this recession is. At this point of the cycle after all prior recessions since WWII, the employment has recovered to pre-recession levels. In this recession, we are still 5% down.
http://cr4re.com/charts/charts.html

Posted by: Nino | July 22, 2011 at 05:29 PM

I look at PAYEMS (see below) and what do I see ? I see PAYEMS moving sideways since 2000/2001 so that after a decade of nonsense we find ourselves with 29,502.4 (Thousands (!)) less jobs than we would have had had the pre-2000/2001 trend continued to date.

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?chart_type=line&s[1][id]=PAYEMS&log_scales=Left

Posted by: In Hell's Kitchen (NYC) | July 23, 2011 at 09:04 AM

Of course the comparison matter. your comparison against the 1990-91 and 2001 make 2007 look average. When comparing against all post WWII recession/recoveries all three of those recoveries look below average (with all recoveries since 1990 looking very weak indeed). Even then the down-turn was the worst putting the starting point at a very, very low level.

Posted by: RangerHondo | July 26, 2011 at 08:48 AM

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July 13, 2011

One more sign of struggles on the job creation front

Hot on the heels of the bleak employment report for June, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics yesterday released another important bit of labor market information: the May Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, commonly known as JOLTS. Calculated Risk accentuated the positive:

"In general job openings (yellow) has been trending up—and job openings increased slightly again in May—and are up about 7% year-over-year compared to May 2010.

"Overall turnover is increasing too, but remains low. Quits increased again and have been trending up—and quits are now up about 10% year-over-year (usually a sign of more confidence in the labor market)."

The hires and quits angle was noted at Modeled Behavior as well, but at Zero Hedge Tyler Durden isn't in the mood for even muted optimism:

"There was nothing to smile about in today's May JOLTS release from the BLS."

Durden focuses first on the job openings piece of JOLTS:

"Those expecting a pick up in job openings (traditionally the key requirement for an [sic] sustained increase in NFP) will have to wait some more, after the May number came at 3.0 million, the same as April."

Longtime readers of macroblog know that the job openings data are favorites of ours, which we like to view through the prism of the Beveridge curve. This curve plots the relationship between job openings and unemployment. In past posts—here and here, for example—I have noted that:

  • The Beveridge curve appears to have shifted out over time, meaning that the amount of unemployment relative to the number of job openings has increased over the past several years relative to the patterns of the decade or so prior to the beginning of this recovery.
  • This shift in the Beveridge curve is usually interpreted as representing a change in the efficiency with which workers looking for jobs are matched with employers looking to fill jobs (though the source of the inefficiency is not completely obvious).
  • There is a debate about whether the recent shift in the Beveridge curve is a normal cyclical feature of recoveries—in which case the pace at which the unemployed are placed in open jobs ought to pick up over time—or a symptom of deeper structural problems that are likely to persist for, forgive me, an extended period of time.


For most of this year, it did appear that the Beveridge curve was moving back in the direction of its 2000–9. That progress was interrupted in May:


I don't think that resolves the cyclical-versus-structural debate, but it certainly is not good news. And at this point it is awfully hard to believe that things are going to look better in the June version of JOLTS.

Update: Another way to view the problem, from Steve Davis.

David Altig By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

July 13, 2011 in Business Cycles, Labor Markets | Permalink

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"The Beveridge curve appears to have shifted out over time, meaning that the amount of unemployment relative to the number of job openings has increased over the past several years relative to the patterns of the decade or so prior to the beginning of this recovery. "

"This shift in the Beveridge curve is usually interpreted as representing a change in the efficiency with which workers looking for jobs are matched with employers looking to fill jobs "

what ????

we have a huge imbalance
a horrid B ratio
and its not effective demand driving it ???

its inefficiency ???
and or
poor job to skill match ups ??


what's in the water cooler down there hoss ???
--------------------

"There is a debate about whether the recent shift in the Beveridge curve is a normal cyclical feature of recoveries"

debate ???

why the sentence makes no sense

are you saying over the employment cycle
the ratio oughta stay constant ???

simply bob up and down along some line ???

what is it about thses numbers
you find worthy of debate ???


now one might look at employment cycles versus employment cycles
to see how the change in the ratios over the cycle compare

cycle versus cycle

but you ain't got a cycle here yet pard

the hot house agonizing over
is this huge jobless army structural ??

pure misdirection
plain and simple
and
its hard to imagine you take it seriously

Posted by: paine | July 14, 2011 at 08:39 PM

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