macroblog

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The Atlanta Fed's macroblog provides commentary and analysis on economic topics including monetary policy, macroeconomic developments, inflation, labor economics, and financial issues.

Authors for macroblog are Dave Altig, John Robertson, and other Atlanta Fed economists and researchers.


May 31, 2012


What is shadow banking?

What is shadow banking? Announcing a new index—hat tip to Ryan McCarthy—Deloitte offers its own definition:

"Shadow banking is a market-funded, credit intermediation system involving maturity and/or liquidity transformation through securitization and secured-funding mechanisms. It exists at least partly outside of the traditional banking system and does not have government guarantees in the form of insurance or access to the central bank."

As the Deloitte study makes clear, this definition is fairly narrow—it doesn't, for example, include hedge funds. Though Deloitte puts the size of the shadow banking sector at $10 trillion in 2010, other well-known measures range from $15 trillion to $24 trillion. (One of those alternative estimates comes from an important study by Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Hayley Boesky from the New York Fed.)

What definition of shadow banking you prefer probably depends on the questions you are trying to answer. Since the interest in shadow banking today is clearly motivated by the financial crisis and its regulatory aftermath, a definition that focuses on systemically risky institutions has a lot of appeal. And not all entities that might be reasonably put in the shadow banking bucket fall into the systemically risky category. Former PIMCO Senior Partner Paul McCulley offered this perspective at the Atlanta Fed's recent annual Financial Markets Conference (video link here):

"...clearly, the money market mutual fund, that 2a-7 fund as it's known here in the United States, is the bedrock of the shadow banking system...

"The money market mutual fund industry is a huge industry and poses massive systemic risk to the system because it's subject to runs, because it's not just as good as an FDIC bank deposit. We found out that in spades in 2008...

"In fact, I can come up with an example of shadow banking that really didn't have a deleterious effect in 2008, and that was hedge funds with very long lockups on their liability. So hedge funds are shadow banks that are levered up intermediaries, but by having long lockups on their liabilities, then they weren't part and parcel of a run because they were locked up."

The more narrow Deloitte definition is thus very much in the spirit of the systemic risk definition. But even though this measure does not cover all the shadow banking activities with which policymakers might be concerned, other measures of the trend in the size of the sector look pretty much like the one below, which is from the Deloitte report:

The Deloitte report makes this sensible observation regarding the decline in the size of the shadow banking sector:

"Does this mean that the significance of the shadow banking system is overrated? No. The growth of shadow banking was fueled historically by financial innovation. A new activity not previously created could be categorized as shadow banking and could creep back into the system quickly. That new innovation might be but a distant notion at best in someone's mind today, but could pose a systemic risk concern in the future."

Ed Kane, another participant in our recent conference, went one step further with a familiar theme of his: new shadows are guaranteed to emerge, as part of the "regulatory dialectic"—an endless cycle of regulation and market innovation.

In getting to the essence of what the future of shadow banking will (or should) be, I think it is instructive to consider a set of questions that were posed at the conference by Washington University professor Phil Dybvig. I'm highlighting three of his five questions here:

"1. Is creation of liquidity by banks surplus liquidity in the economy or does it serve a useful economic purpose?

"2. How about creation of liquidity by the shadow banking sector? Was it surplus? Did it represent liquidity banks could have provided?...

"5. If there was too much liquidity in the economy, why? Some people have argued that it was because of too much stimulus and the government kept interest rates too low (and perhaps the Chinese government had a role as well as the US government). I don't want to take a side on these claims, but it is an important empirical question whether the explosion of the huge shadow banking sector was a distortion that was an unintended side effect of policy or whether it is an essential feature of a healthy economy."

Virtually all regulatory reforms will entail costs (some of them unintended), as well as benefits. Sensible people may come to quite different conclusions about how the scales tip in this regard. A good example is provided by the debate from another session at our conference on reform of money market mutual funds between Eric Rosengren, president of the Boston Fed, and Karen Dunn Kelley of Invesco. And we could see proposals by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the future to enact further reforms to the money market mutual fund industry. But whether any of these efforts are durable solutions to the systemic risk profile of the shadow banking sector must surely depend on the answers to Phil Dybvig's important questions.

David AltigBy Dave Altig, executive vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

May 31, 2012 in Banking, Financial System, Money Markets | Permalink

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How has liquidity varied in the U.S., or perhaps OECD countries, since WWII? How have taxes affected the emergence of "shadow banking" if at all?

Posted by: Tom Shillock | June 01, 2012 at 12:53 PM

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December 02, 2011


The ongoing lender of last resort debate

Two days do not a policy success make, and it is a fool's game to tie the merits of a policy action to a short-term stock market cycle. But at first blush it does certainly appear that Wednesday's announcement of coordinated central bank actions to provide liquidity support to the global financial system had a positive effect. The policy is described in the Board of Governors press release:

"The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank… have agreed to lower the pricing on the existing temporary U.S. dollar liquidity swap arrangements by 50 basis points so that the new rate will be the U.S. dollar overnight index swap (OIS) rate plus 50 basis points. This pricing will be applied to all operations conducted from December 5, 2011. The authorization of these swap arrangements has been extended to February 1, 2013."

Or, as explained by The Wall Street Journal:

"Under the program, the Fed lends dollars to other central banks, which in turn make the dollars available to banks under their jurisdiction. The action Wednesday made these emergency Fed loans cheaper, lowering their cost by half a percentage point.

"When the Fed launched the swap lines, it saw them as critical to its efforts to tame the financial storm sweeping the globe. Banks in Europe and elsewhere hold U.S. mortgage securities and other U.S. dollar securities. They get U.S. dollars in short-term lending markets to pay for these holdings. In 2008, when dollar loans became scarce, foreign banks were forced to dump their holdings of U.S. mortgages and other loans, which in turn pushed up the cost of credit for Americans.

"The latest action was at least in part an attempt to head off a repeat of such a spiral."

It is at least interesting that this most recent Fed action occurs as criticism of its past actions to address the financial crisis has once again arisen. The immediate driver is another installment in a series of Bloomberg reports that parse recently released details from Fed lending programs during the period from 2007 to 2009.

I have in the past objected to the somewhat conspiratorial tone in which the Bloomberg folks have chosen to cast the conversation. I certainly do not, however, think it objectionable to have a cool-headed conversation on what we can learn from the Fed's actions during the financial crisis and how it might inform policy going forward. Following on the latest Bloomberg article, Felix Salmon and Brad DeLong have taken up that cause.

It may be useful to start with my institution's official answers to the question: Why did the Federal Reserve lend to banks and other financial institutions during the financial crisis?

"Intense strains in financial markets during the financial crisis severely disrupted the flow of credit to U.S. households and businesses and led to a deep downturn in economic activity and a sharp increase in unemployment. Consistent with its statutory mandate to foster maximum employment and stable prices, the Federal Reserve established lending programs during the crisis to address the strains in financial markets, support the flow of credit to American families and firms, and foster economic recovery."

Neither Salmon nor DeLong argues with this assertion, and even the Bloomberg article includes commentary broadly supporting Fed actions, even if not all details of the implementation. More controversial is this observation from the Fed's frequently asked questions (FAQs):

"The Federal Reserve followed sound risk-management practices under all of its liquidity and credit programs. Credit provided under these programs was fully collateralized to protect the Fed—and ultimately the taxpayer—from loss."

Here is where opinions start to diverge. From DeLong:

"In the fall of 2008, counting the Fed and the Treasury together, a peak of 90% of Morgan Stanley's equity—the capital of the firm genuinely at risk—was U.S. government money. That money was genuinely at risk: had Morgan Stanley's assets taken another dive in value and blown through the private-sector's minimal equity cushion, it would have been taxpayers whose money would have been used to pay off the firm's more senior liabilities. 'Fully collateralized' the loans may have been, but had anything impaired that collateral there was no way on God's Green Earth Morgan Stanley—or any of the other banks—could have come up with the money to make the government whole."

And from Salmon:

"The Fed likes to say that it wasn't taking much if any credit risk here: that all its lending was fully collateralized, etc etc. But it's really hard to look at that red line and have a huge amount of confidence that the Fed was always certain to get its money back. Still, this is what lenders of last resort do. And this is what the ECB is most emphatically not doing."

As Salmon's comment makes clear, he does not view these risks as a repudiation of the appropriateness of what the Fed did during the crisis. And if I read Brad DeLong correctly, his main complaint is not about the programs per se, but on the pricing of the support provided to banks:

"When you contribute equity capital, and when things turn out well, you deserve an equity return. When you don't take equity—when you accept the risks but give the return to somebody else—you aren't acting as a good agent for your principals, the taxpayers.

"Thus I do not understand why officials from the Fed and the Treasury keep telling me that the U.S. couldn't or shouldn't have profited immensely from its TARP and other loans to banks. Somebody owns that equity value right now. It's not the government. But when the chips were down it was the government that bore the risk. That's what a lender of last resort does."

I wish that we could stop commingling TARP and the Fed's liquidity programs. At the very least, the legal authorities for the programs were completely distinct, and the Federal Reserve did not have any direct authority for the implementation of the TARP program. But that is probably beside the point for the current discussion. What is germane is the observation that the TARP funds did come with equity warrants issued to the Treasury. So in that case, there was the equity stake that DeLong urges.

As for the Fed programs, here again is a response taken from Fed FAQs:

"As verified by our independent auditors, the Federal Reserve did not incur any losses in connection with its lending programs. In fact, the Federal Reserve has generated very substantial net income since 2007 that has been remitted to the U.S. Treasury."

This observation does not, of course, repudiate Felix Salmon's point that losses may have been incurred, or the DeLong argument that the rates paid for loans from the Fed were not high enough by some metric. Nor should turning a profit be seen as proof that lending policies were sound (just as incurring losses would not be proof that the policies were foolhardy). But doesn't the record at least provide some support for a case that the Fed used reasonable judgment with respect to its lending decisions and acted as prudent steward of taxpayer funds even as it took extraordinary measures to address the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression?

In fact, the main point raised by Felix Salmon is not that risks were taken, but that those risks were not communicated in a transparent way:

"And it's frankly ridiculous that it's taken this long for this information to be made public. We're now fully ten months past the point at which the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's final report was published; this data would have been extremely useful to them and to all of the rest of us trying to get a grip on what was going on at the height of the crisis. The Fed's argument against publishing the data was that it 'would create a stigma,' and make it less likely that banks would tap similar facilities in future. But I can assure you that at the height of the crisis, the last thing on Morgan Stanley's mind was the worry that its borrowings might be made public three years later. When you need the money, and the Fed is throwing its windows wide open, you don't look that kind of gift horse in the mouth."

One thing I wish to continually stress is that we should be clear about what Bloomberg refers to as "secret loans." One last time from the Fed FAQs:

"All of the Federal Reserve's lending programs were announced prior to implementation and the amounts of support provided were easily tracked in weekly and monthly reports on the Federal Reserve Board's website."

So the missing information was not about the sums of money being lent but the exact details of who was receiving those loans. In most cases, these loans were not targeted to specific institutions, but obtained from open funding facilities such as the Term Auction Facility. And, though you can argue the point, stigma was a real concern, as Chairman Bernanke has testified:

"Many banks, however, were evidently concerned that if they borrowed from the discount window, and that fact somehow became known to market participants, they would be perceived as weak and, consequently, might come under further pressure from creditors. To address this so-called stigma problem, the Federal Reserve created a new discount window program, the Term Auction Facility (TAF). Under the TAF, the Federal Reserve has regularly auctioned large blocks of credit to depository institutions. For various reasons, including the competitive format of the auctions, the TAF has not suffered the stigma of conventional discount window lending and has proved effective for injecting liquidity into the financial system."

Salmon argues that this resolution to the stigma problem would not have been weakened by the current rules that require reporting the lending specifics with a lag. It is a reasonable argument (in what is, as an aside, a balanced and reasoned article by Salmon), and reasonable people can disagree. In any event, lagged reporting of details on the recipients of Fed loans is now the law. As a consequence, if such liquidity programs are needed again we can only hope that Felix Salmon's beliefs turn out to be true.


UPDATE: The Board of Governors has posted a response to recent reports on the Federal Reserve's lending policies.

David AltigBy Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

 

December 2, 2011 in Banking, Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy, Financial System, Monetary Policy | Permalink

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Laziness is no excuse for ignorance, but sometimes information isn't easy to find. Although, the press will report what sells, others lack the...ability and know-how to find the information they are looking for sometimes.

A question the tech & internet industry pose for the future is;

"how can information we are looking for find us?"

A good starting point for answering this is, how do we find information?

Posted by: Jake Lopata | December 02, 2011 at 02:48 PM

Stock markets' reaction to a 50 bps cut in swap rates is no measure of the success of the policy, but a reaction to the optics of central bank coordination. As to the Fed's extraordinary support to banks and the subsequent secrecy, that is troubling. You may say the Depression was avoided, but if it worked, why are we back in the soup with the same sort of action required?

Posted by: demandside | December 03, 2011 at 09:31 AM

"...it is a fool's game to tie the merits of a policy action
to a short-term stock market cycle.

But at first blush it does certainly appear
that Wednesday's announcement
of coordinated central bank actions to provide liquidity support
to the global financial system
had a positive effect."

Dave Altig,
senior vice president and research director
at the Atlanta Fed
.
.
Could the second statement make you appear a bit foolish?
.
.
"It is at least interesting that this most recent Fed action
occurs as criticism of its past actions
to address the financial crisis has once again arisen.

...the Bloomberg article includes commentary
broadly supporting Fed actions,
even if not all details of the implementation."

Dave Altig,
senior vice president and research director
at the Atlanta Fed
.
.
Were there crimes committed Dave?
.
.
"...doesn't the record at least provide some support for a case
that the Fed used reasonable judgment
with respect to its lending decisions
and acted as prudent steward of taxpayer funds
even as it took extraordinary measures
to address the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression? "

Dave Altig,
senior vice president and research director
at the Atlanta Fed
.
.
No.


Posted by: Abner Doon | December 03, 2011 at 05:51 PM

First and foremost the Federal Reserve continually using equity reactions to gauge policy appeal is getting absurd. The stock market voting mechanism is becoming more polluted and distorted by the day. As a result, signal is beginning to look a lot more like noise and its relative usefulness as signal is diminishing.

Swap lines to the ECB are only as good as the ECB as an institution exists. While Europe as a continent has been around for the ages, ECB as an institution has not. To lend dollars cheaper to an institution that is failing to keep its own house in order strikes me as dangerous in itself, let alone lending these dollars at lower rates than they are available to our own banks.

Which brings me to my final point. The problems now are not about liquidity, they are about credit. The institutions that have kept their leverage at 50:1, never marked down their books and never took the opportunity to raise capital during good times should be punished. The fed has kept the 'too big to fail' problem alive and now it is exporting this policy as well.

Posted by: brian | December 13, 2011 at 07:38 AM

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July 30, 2010


Some observations regarding interest on reserves

One of the livelier discussions following Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke's testimony to Congress on monetary policy has revolved around the issue of the payment of interest on bank reserves. Here, for what it's worth, are a few reactions to questions raised by that discussion:

Is interest paid on reserves (IOR) a free lunch?

Ken Houghton has the following objection:

"… in September of 2008, the Fed decides to pay interest on reserves—including Excess Reserves. The banks can now make 25 times what they pay in interest, risk-free, just by holding onto money. The Fed is, essentially, leaving $100 bills on the sidewalk."

I'm not sure exactly where the "25 times" comes from, but it seems to me that the most obvious transaction would be to borrow in the overnight interbank lending market—the federal funds market—and then "lend" those funds to the Fed by placing them in the Fed's deposit facility. The differential between the return on those options is a good deal lower than a multiple of 25.

073010a
(enlarge)

In fact, as many have noted before, the puzzle is why the gap between the funds rate and the deposit rate exists at all. As explained on the New York Fed's FAQ sheet:

"With the payment of interest on excess balances, market participants will have little incentive for arranging federal funds transactions at rates below the rate paid on excess. By helping set a floor on market rates in this way, payment of interest on excess balances will enhance the Desk's ability to keep the federal funds rate around the target for the federal funds rate."

It didn't quite work out that way, so clearly there is a limit to arbitrage. But if you really think that an 8 basis point spread between the effective funds rate and the deposit rate is a problem, the best approach would be, in my opinion, to address the institutional arrangements that are limiting arbitrage in the funds market. (Some of those features are discussed here and here.)

 What is the opportunity cost of not lending?

That said, certainly the real issue about the IOR policy concerns the presumed incentive for banks to sit on excess reserves rather than putting those reserves into use by creating loans. This, from Bruce Bartlett, is fairly representative of the view that IOR is, at least in part, to blame for the slow pace of credit expansion in the United States:

"… As I pointed out in my column last week, banks have more than $1 trillion of excess reserves—money that the Fed has created that banks could lend immediately but are just sitting on. It's the economic equivalent of stuffing cash under one's mattress.

"Economists are divided on why banks are not lending, but increasingly are focusing on a Fed policy of paying interest on reserves—a policy that began, interestingly enough, on October 9, 2008, at almost exactly the moment when the financial crisis became acute."

OK, but the spread that really matters in the bank lending decision is surely the difference between the return on depositing excess reserves with the Fed versus the return on making loans. In fairness, it does appear that this spread dropped when the IOR was raised from its implicit prior setting of zero…

073010b
(enlarge)


… but it's also pretty clear that this development largely reflects a general fall in market yields post-October 2008 as much is it does the increase in IOR rate:


073010c
(enlarge)

And here's another thought: As of now, the IOR policy applies to all reserves, required or excess. Consider the textbook example of a bank that creates a loan. In the simple example, a bank creates a loan asset on its book by creating a checking account for a customer, which is the corresponding liability. It needs reserves to absorb this new liability, of course, so the process of creating a loan converts excess reserves into required reserves. But if the Fed pays the same rate on both required and excess reserves, the bank will have lost nothing in terms of what it collects from the Fed for its reserve deposits. In this simple case, the IOR plays no role in determining the opportunity cost of extending credit.

Of course, the funds created in making a loan may leave the originating bank. Though reserves don't leave the banking system as a whole, they may certainly flow away from an individual institution. So things may not be as nice and neat as my simple example.  But at worst, that just brings the question back to the original point: Is the 25 basis point return paid by the central bank creating a significant incentive for banks to sit on reserves rather than lend them out to consumers or businesses? At least some observers are skeptical:

"Barclays Capital's Joseph Abate…noted much of the money that constitutes this giant pile of reserves is 'precautionary liquidity.' If banks didn't get interest from the Fed they would shift those funds into short-term, low-risk markets such as the repo, Treasury bill and agency discount note markets, where the funds are readily accessible in case of need. Put another way, Abate doesn't see this money getting tied up in bank loans or the other activities that would help increase credit, in turn boosting overall economic momentum."

Are there good reasons for paying interest on reserves?

Even if we concede that there is some gain from eliminating or cutting the IOR rate, what of the costs? Tim Duy, quoting the Wall Street Journal, makes note (as does Steve Williamson) of the following comment from the Chairman:

"… Lowering the interest rate it pays on excess reserve—now at 0.25%—could create trouble in money markets, he said.

" 'The rationale for not going all the way to zero has been that we want the short-term money markets, like the federal funds market, to continue to function in a reasonable way,' he said.

" 'Because if rates go to zero, there will be no incentive for buying and selling federal funds—overnight money in the banking system—and if that market shuts down … it'll be more difficult to manage short-term interest rates when the Federal Reserve begins to tighten policy at some point in the future.' "

Professor Duy interprets this as aversion to the possibility that "the failure to meet expectations would be the real cost to the Federal Reserve," but I would  have taken the words for exactly what they seem to say—that the skills and infrastructure required to maintain a functioning federal funds rate might atrophy if cutting the rate to zero brings activity in the market to a trickle. And that observation is relevant because of the following, from the minutes of the April 27–28 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee:

"Meeting participants agreed broadly on key objectives of a longer-run strategy for asset sales and redemptions. The strategy should be consistent with the achievement of the Committee's objectives of maximum employment and price stability. In addition, the strategy should normalize the size and composition of the balance sheet over time. Reducing the size of the balance sheet would decrease the associated reserve balances to amounts consistent with more normal operations of money markets and monetary policy."

"Normal" may not mean the exact status quo ante, but to the extent that federal funds targeting is a desirable part of the picture, it sure will be helpful if a federal funds market exists.

Even if you don't buy that argument—and the point is debatable—it is useful to recall that the IOR policy has long been promoted on efficiency grounds. There is this argument for example, from a New York Fed article published just as the IOR policy was introduced:

"… reserve balances are used to make interbank payments; thus, they serve as the final form of settlement for a vast array of transactions. The quantity of reserves needed for payment purposes typically far exceeds the quantity consistent with the central bank's desired interest rate. As a result, central banks must perform a balancing act, drastically increasing the supply of reserves during the day for payment purposes through the provision of daylight reserves (also called daylight credit) and then shrinking the supply back at the end of the day to be consistent with the desired market interest rate.

"… it is important to understand the tension between the daylight and overnight need for reserves and the potential problems that may arise. One concern is that central banks typically provide daylight reserves by lending directly to banks, which may expose the central bank to substantial credit risk. Such lending may also generate moral hazard problems and exacerbate the too-big-to-fail problem, whereby regulators would be reluctant to close a financially troubled bank."

Put more simply, one broad justification for an IOR policy is precisely that it induces banks to hold quantities of excess reserves that are large enough to mitigate the need for central banks to extend the credit necessary to keep the payments system running efficiently. And, of course, mitigating those needs also means mitigating the attendant risks.

That is not to say that these risks or efficiency costs unambiguously dominate other considerations—for a much deeper discussion I refer you to a recent piece by Tom Sargent. But they should not be lost in the conversation.

By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

July 30, 2010 in Banking, Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy, Monetary Policy | Permalink

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Is there some institutional constraint the forces IOR to be a multiple of 25 bps? Are holding steady and going to zero the only options?

Posted by: Andy Harless | July 31, 2010 at 01:41 PM

You refer to “…the presumed incentive for banks to sit on excess reserves rather than putting those reserves into use by creating loans.” That statement is incompatible with the widely accepted view that banks just don’t lend reserves. That is, where a bank sees a profitable lending opportunity, it just creates money out of thin air, e.g. it credits the borrower’s account. And in the current “excess reserve” scenario, the bank presumably has more than enough reserves, thus the latter are irrelevant.

In more normal times, that is where the banking system does not have excess reserves, reserves are still irrelevant. That is, a bank which sees a profitable lending opportunity goes ahead (as above) and credits its customer’s account. If that leaves the banking system short of reserves, the FED is then forced to supply extra reserves to the system, else interest rates are forced up.

Posted by: Ralph Musgrave | August 01, 2010 at 01:58 PM

IORs were originated by the same people that think commercial banks are financial intermediaires (intermediary between saver and borrower). Never are the CBs intermediaries in the lending process.

The money supply historically has never been, and can never be, managed by any attempt to control the cost of credit.

IORs are a credit control device. They are the funcational equivalent to required reserves. I.e., the BOG determines when the member banks can lend and invest.

This discussion is complete nonsense. If the IORs don't serve a purpose, then save the taxpayers some money.

The evidence is extremely clearcut. Burns, Miller, Volcker, Greenspan, & Bernanke have all screwed up using interest rate targets.

(1) Paul Volcker won acclaim for taming the inflation that he alone created.

(2) Bernanke didn't "ease" monetary policy when Bear Sterns 2 hedge funds collapsed. He initiated "credit easing" while continuing with his 25 consecutive months of policy "tightening" that began in Feb 2006. Instead Bernanke waited until Lehman Brothers failed. Bernanke drove this country into a deep depression by himself.

(3) Greenspan never "tightened" monetary policy towards the end of his term. Despite raising the FFR 17 times, Greenspan maintained his "loose" money policy, i.e., for the last 41 consecutive months of his term.

By using the wrong criteria (interest rates, rather than member bank reserves) in formulating and executing monetary policy, the Federal Reserve became an engine of inflation and a doomsday machine.

Posted by: flow5 | August 01, 2010 at 04:07 PM

I'm curious how a comparison of US spreads and Swedish spreads would look, given that the Swedish central bank has introduced a penalty on reserves. If I follow the arguments your presenting, the Swedish policy should not have had much effect on spreads, but would be driving liquidity into non-reserve forms, potentially undermining money market institutions. Can any of these expected outcomes actually be observed?

Posted by: Rich C | August 02, 2010 at 03:36 PM

The reason the fed funds rate can be below the IROR is that insurance companies and GSEs have access to the fed funds market but are not holders of deposits at the Fed. Hence they are willing lenders in the fed funds market at a rate below IROR, whereas the banks are the borrowers who then deposit these funds as reserves on which the Fed pays interest.

Posted by: emsoly | August 04, 2010 at 07:39 AM

Why wouldn't the FED charge negative interest on these reserves to spur lending? Thanks.

Posted by: Jonathan Herbert | August 06, 2010 at 02:56 AM

Even Dave Altig is too harsh on IOR here:
"OK, but the spread that really matters in the bank lending decision is surely the difference between the return on depositing excess reserves with the Fed versus the return on making loans."
This ignores the fact that before the IOR policy reserves were artificially scarce, and this scarcity yield was approximately equal to fed funds rate, so net spreads were actually narrower before October 2008.

More here:
http://themoneydemand.blogspot.com/2010/08/should-fed-stop-paying-interest-on.html

Posted by: The Money Demand Blog | August 06, 2010 at 05:35 AM

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June 30, 2010


Keeping an eye on Europe

In June, a third of the economists in the Blue Chip panel of economic forecasters indicated that they had lowered their growth forecast over the next 18 months as a consequence of Europe's debt crisis. When pushed a little further, 31 percent said that weaker exports would be the channel through which this problem would hinder growth, while 69 percent thought that "tighter financial conditions" would be the channel through which debt problems in Europe could hit U.S. shores.

Tighter financial conditions also were mentioned by the Federal Open Market Committee in its last statement, where the committee noted, "Financial conditions have become less supportive of economic growth on balance, largely reflecting developments abroad."

In his speech today, Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart identified the European sovereign debt crisis as one of the sources of uncertainty for the U.S. economy that he believes "have clouded the outlook." President Lockhart explicitly expressed his concern that Europe's "continuing and possibly escalating financial market pressures will be transmitted through interconnected banking and capital markets to our economy."

Negative effects from the European sovereign debt crisis can be transmitted to the U.S. economy through a number of financial channels, including higher risk premiums on private securities, a considerable rise in uncertainty, and sharply increased risk aversion. Another important channel is the direct exposure of the U.S. banking sector—both through holdings of troubled European assets and counterparty exposure to European banks, which not only have a substantial exposure to the debt-laden European countries but have also been facing higher funding costs. The LIBOR-OIS spread has widened notably (see the chart below), liquidity is now concentrated in tenors of one week and shorter, and the market has become notably tiered.

063010a
(enlarge)

Banks in the most affected countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy) and other European banks perceived as having a sizeable exposure to those countries have to pay higher rates and borrow at shorter tenors. Although for now U.S. banks can raise funds more cheaply than many European financial institutions, some analysts believe that there's a risk that the short-term offshore dollar market may become increasingly strained, leading to funding shortages and, conceivably, forced asset sales.

Bank for International Settlements data through the end of December of last year show that the U.S. banking system's risk exposure to the most vulnerable EU countries appears to be manageable. U.S. banks' on-balance sheet financial claims vis-á-vis those countries, adjusted for guarantees and collateral, look substantial in absolute terms but are rather small relative to the size of U.S. banks' total financial assets (see the chart below). The exposure to Spain is the biggest, closely followed by Ireland and Italy. Overall, the five countries account for less than 2 percent of U.S. banks' assets.

063010b
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U.S. exposure to developed Europe as a whole, however, is much higher at $1.2 trillion, so U.S. financial institutions may feel some pain if the European economy slows down markedly. How likely is a marked slowdown? It's difficult to determine, of course, but when asked about the largest risks facing the U.S. economy over the next year, the Blue Chip forecasters put "spillover effects of Europe's debt crisis" at the top of their list.

By Galina Alexeenko, economic policy analyst at the Atlanta Fed

June 30, 2010 in Banking, Europe, Forecasts | Permalink

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I honestly think we have reached the end of the road for monetary policy. How cheap can money get? the banks are still in bad shape.

If there is a stimulus to come, it must be from fiscal policy-and not spending.

Tax cuts. Only way to get out of the morass.

Posted by: Jeff | July 05, 2010 at 10:55 PM

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May 28, 2010


How "discouraged" are small businesses? Insights from an Atlanta Fed small business lending survey

Roughly half of U.S. workers are employed at firms with fewer than 500 employees, and about 90 percent of U.S. firms have fewer than 20 employees. While estimates vary, small businesses are also credited with creating the lion's share of net new jobs. Small businesses are, in total, a big deal. Thus, it is no surprise that there is congressional debate going on about how to best aid small businesses and promote job growth. Many people have noted the decline in small business lending during the recession, and some have suggested proposals to give incentives to banks to increase their small business portfolios. But is a lack of willingness to lend to small businesses really what's behind the decline in small business lending? Or is it the lack of creditworthy demand resulting from the effects of the recession and housing market distress?

Economists often face such identification dilemmas, situations in which we would like to know whether supply or demand is the driving factor behind changes within a market. Additional data can often help solve the problem. In this case we might want to know about all of the loans applied for by small businesses, whether the loans were granted and at what rates, and specific information on loan quality and collateral. Alas, such data are not available. In fact, the Congressional Oversight Panel in a recent report recommends that the U.S. Treasury and other regulators "establish a rigorous data collection system or survey that examines small business finance" and notes that "the lack of timely and consistent data has significantly hampered efforts to approach and address the crisis."

We at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta have also noted the paucity of data in this area and have begun a series of small business credit surveys. Leveraging the contacts in our Regional Economic Information Network (REIN), we polled 311 small businesses in the states of the Sixth District (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Tennessee) on their credit experiences and future plans. While the survey is not a stratified random sample and so should not be viewed as a statistical representation of small business firms in the Sixth District, we believe the results are informative.

Indeed, the results of our April 2010 survey suggest that demand-side factors may be the driving force behind lower levels of small business credit. To be sure, when asked about the recent obstacles to accessing credit, some firms (34 firms, or 11 percent of our sample) cited banks' unwillingness to lend, but many more firms cited factors that may reflect low credit quality on the part of prospective borrowers. For example, 32 percent of firms cited a decline in sales over the past two years as an obstacle, 19 percent cited a high level of outstanding business or personal debt, 10 percent cited a less than stellar credit score, and 112 firms (32 percent) report no recent obstacles to credit. Perhaps not surprisingly, outside of the troubled construction and real estate industries, close to half the firms polled (46 percent) do not believe there are any obstacles while only 9 percent report unwillingness on the part of banks.

These opinions are reinforced by responses detailing the firms' decisions to seek or not seek credit and the outcomes of submitted credit applications.

052810a
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Of the 191 firms that did not seek credit in the past three months, 131 (69 percent) report that they either had sufficient cash on hand, did not have the sales/revenues to warrant additional debt, or did not need credit. (Note the percentages in the chart above reflect multiple responses by firms.) These responses likely reflect both the impact of the recession on the revenues of small firms as well as precautionary/prudent cash management.

The administration has recently sent draft legislation to Congress for a supply-side program—the Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF)—to address the funding needs of small businesses. The congressional oversight report raises a good question about the potential effectiveness of supply-side programs:

"A small business loan is, at its heart, a contract between two parties: a bank that is willing and able to lend, and a business that is creditworthy and in need of a loan. Due to the recession, relatively few small businesses now fit that description. To the extent that contraction in small business lending reflects a shortfall of demand rather than of supply, any supply-side solution will fail to gain traction."

That said, one way that a supply-side program like SBLF would make sense, even if low demand is the force driving lower lending rates, is if there are high-quality borrowers that are not applying for credit merely because they anticipate that they will be denied. We could term these firms "discouraged borrowers," to co-opt a term from labor markets (i.e., discouraged workers).

If a program increased the perceived probability of approval, either by increasing approval rates via a subsidization of small business lending or merely by changing borrower beliefs, more high-quality, productive loans would be made.

Just how many discouraged borrowers are out there? The chart above illustrates that, indeed, 16 percent of all of our responding firms and 21 percent of construction and real estate firms might fall into this category. I add "might" because the anticipation of a denial may well be accurate but based on a lack of creditworthiness and not the irrational or inefficient behavior of banks. Digging into our results, we find that 35 percent of the firms who did not seek credit because of the anticipation of a denial also cited "not enough sales," indicating that a denial would likely have reflected underlying loan quality.

In the labor market, so-called "discouraged workers" flow back into the labor force when they perceive that the probability of finding an acceptable job has increased enough to make searching for work, and working, attractive again. We should expect so-called "discouraged borrowers" to do the same. That's because if they don't, the likely alternatives for them, at some point, would be to sell the business or go out of business. It seems unlikely that, facing such alternatives, a "discouraged" firm would not attempt to access credit. The responses of firms in our sample are consistent with this logic; 55 percent of those who did not seek credit in the past three months because of the anticipation of a denial indicated that they plan to seek credit in the next six months.

Our results also provide some interesting data on an assumption underlying the policy debate: that those small businesses are credit constrained. Of the 117 firms in the survey that that sought credit during the previous three months, the following chart illustrates the extent to which these firms met their financing needs.

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Based on firm reports of the credit channel applications submitted in the previous three months, we created a financing index value for each firm. Firms that were denied on all of their credit applications have a financing index equal to 1, while firms that received all of the funding requested have an index level of 5. Index levels between 1 and 5 indicate, from lesser to greater, the extent to which their applications were successful. In the chart we plot data on the financing index levels of all firms in our sample and then split according to whether the firm is in construction and real estate. Among construction and real estate firms, 50 percent of firms had an index below 2.5, suggesting most did not get their financing requests meet. In contrast, the median index value of 4.7 for all other firms suggests that most of these firm were able to obtain all or most of the credit they requested. This difference between real estate–related firms and others is really not surprising given that the housing sector was at the heart of the financial crisis and recession. But it does suggest that more work needs to be done to analyze the industry-specific funding constraints among small businesses.

By Paula Tkac, assistant vice president and senior economist, of the Atlanta Fed

May 28, 2010 in Banking, Saving, Capital, and Investment, Small Business | Permalink

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Hi,

Excellent article; I have plugged it over at my own blog (and at Global Economy Matters). I don't know why the trackback has not shown up yet.

Anyway, it was very interesting get some real hard evidence (even if it is very specific sample) that deleveraging is NOT only driven by supply side constraints; to me this is one of the big untold stories of this financial crisis.

best

Claus

Posted by: claus vistesen | May 31, 2010 at 09:32 AM

We have to admit that cash flow is one of the most common challenges entrepreneurs face. A prudent cash management
strategy has been proven to be vital in preserving a business capital and return.

Posted by: insolvency advice | July 19, 2010 at 12:13 AM

Yes we have to admit about the cash flow is most common challenges entrepreneurs face.

Posted by: paid surveys | August 29, 2010 at 08:36 AM

Since small business drive the economy cash flow is the most important issue that they have. Buying inventory, making payroll and all the other financial obligations can easily put a company out of business without having access to immediate cash.

Posted by: Dan | March 23, 2011 at 11:28 AM

Great blog.

Posted by: John Byner | March 26, 2011 at 08:43 PM

A good option would be a Business Cash Advance. It is based on your average monthly sales, not credit, so bad credit is ok and approval rates are 98%. They are unsecured, there is no personal guarantees, require no collateral, and will fund within a few days of applying. Also there are no restrictions on how you can use the money.

Posted by: Mark Sanchez | November 15, 2011 at 02:47 AM

It is a good thing to create SBLF because it is appropriately for small business who can't afford the lending terms of the banks.

Posted by: crm software | February 10, 2012 at 07:30 AM

I couldn't agree with this post more. Our economy thrives on the hard work of small businesses, particularly online businesses such as international ecommerce trading firms and even sole proprietorships. Right now, international eCommerce is the only thing driving outside capital right into the heart of this country and keeping the economy afloat.

Posted by: small business loans | May 30, 2012 at 03:15 PM

There are reasons why small business start lending money from the banks and investors, one their reason is to fund money to finance expenses to expand their business.

Posted by: Factoring Service | June 27, 2012 at 09:16 AM

Small company business loans are similar with other economical services such as restaurant financing where economical institutions offer the cash to borrower at time of emergency and charge interest rate.

Posted by: kwik quid | July 13, 2012 at 05:41 AM

I can tell you, they are very discouraged. A lot of them aren't even trying for traditional small business loans anymore.

Posted by: John Walters | July 13, 2012 at 11:12 PM

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May 13, 2010


Regulatory reform via resolution: Maybe not sufficient, certainly necessary

This macroblog post is the first of several that will feature the Atlanta Fed's 2010 Financial Markets Conference. Please return for additional information.

On Tuesday and Wednesday the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta hosted its annual Financial Markets Conference, titled this year Up From the Ashes: The Financial System After the Crisis. Much of the first day was devoted to conversations about rating agencies and their role in the economy, for better and worse. The second day was absorbed by the issues of too-big-to-fail, macroprudential regulation, and regulatory reform.

One theme that ran throughout the second day's conversations related to the two aspects of regulatory reform highlighted by Chairman Bernanke in his recent congressional testimony on lessons from the failure of Lehman Brothers:

"The Lehman failure provides at least two important lessons. First, we must eliminate the gaps in our financial regulatory framework that allow large, complex, interconnected firms like Lehman to operate without robust consolidated supervision… Second, to avoid having to choose in the future between bailing out a failing, systemically critical firm or allowing its disorderly bankruptcy, we need a new resolution regime, analogous to that already established for failing banks."

Though those two aspects of reform are in no way mutually exclusive, there is, I think, a tendency to lean to one or the other as the first most important contributor to avoiding a repeat of our recent travails. To put it in slightly different terms, there are those that would place greatest emphasis on reducing the probability of systemically important failures and those that would put greatest emphasis on containing the damage when a systemically important failure occurs.

I offered my views last month at the Third Transatlantic Economic Dialogue, hosted by Johns Hopkins University's Center for Transatlantic Relations.

"…the best chance for durable reform is to start with the assumption that failure will happen and construct a strategy for dealing with it when it does…

"In a world with the capacity for rapid innovation, rule-writers have a tendency to perpetually fight the last war…

"I am not arguing that … the 'Volcker rule,' derivative exchanges, trading restrictions, or any of the specific regulatory reform proposals in play are necessarily bad ideas. I am arguing that we should assume that, no matter what proposed safeguards are put in place, failure of some systemically important institution will ultimately occur—somewhere, somehow. And that means priority has to be given to the development of resolution procedures for institutions that are otherwise too big to fail."

At our conference this week, University of Florida professor Mark Flannery expressed concerns that, placed in an international context, a truly robust resolution process for failed institutions may be tough to construct:

"In principle, a non-bankruptcy reorganization channel for SIFIs [systemically important financial institutions] makes a lot of sense. But the complexity of SIFIs' organizational structures introduces some serious problems. Not only do SIFIs operate with a bewildering array of subsidiaries… but they generally operate in many countries. Without very close coordination of resolution decisions across jurisdictions, a U.S. government reorganization would likely set off a scramble for assets of the sort that bankruptcy is meant to avoid. Rapid asset sales could generate downward price spirals… with systemically detrimental effects. Second, supervisors would have to assure that SIFIs maintain the proper sort and quantity of haircut-able liabilities outstanding. Once a firm has been identified as systemically important, this may be a relatively straightforward requirement to impose, but there remains the danger that 'shadow' institutions will become systemically important, before they are properly regulated. (This is not a danger unique to the question of resolution.)

"I conclude that the international coordination required to make prompt resolution feasible for SIFIs is a long way off, if it can be achieved at all."

Not an encouraging note, and the point is very well taken. Flannery concludes that we would be better served by focusing on changes that lie on the "avoiding failure" end of the reform spectrum: standardized derivative contracts, tying supervisory oversight to objective market-based metrics on the health of SIFIs, limitations on risky activities, and higher capital standards.

As I noted above, I am certainly not hostile to these ideas, and the answer to the question "should reform strategies be rules-based or resolution-based?" is surely "all of the above." But even if it will take a long time to develop better resolution procedures to address the types of problems that emerged in the past several years, I strongly argue that development of such procedures are necessary for the long-term, and work on these procedures should begin. And here, I have a relatively modest proposal, returning to my remarks:

"…there is a pretty obvious way to vet proposals that are offered. We have a couple of real-world case studies—Bear Stearns, Lehman, AIG. One test for any proposed resolution process would be to illustrate how that plan would have been implemented in each of those cases. This set of experiments can't be started too soon, and I think should move it to the top of our reform priorities."

Whether it be the specific provisions of reform bills winding their way through Congress or the "living will" idea championed this week by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, I think we would do well to let the stress testing of those proposals begin.

By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

May 13, 2010 in Banking, Financial System, Regulation | Permalink

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My thoughts on this are posted at my blog, www.pointsandfugures.com. To summarize them, we need a drastic change in the structure of the cash equity marketplace. We need to look at the role of each marketplace in the economy, and eliminate some traditional practices.

As far as OTC, we certainly should clear many of them. But there is not any way to safely clear all of them. Let the market decide.

Posted by: Jeff | May 15, 2010 at 06:33 PM

Does anyone at the Fed or within the banking system have a thought on the system as a whole?

We've been "at" capitalism now for a few hundred years. Seems odd that now, in 2010, we need some regulation that some previous authoritative body overlooked.

I'm hinting that the problem is not legal, it's physical. Our current manifestation of economy may in-itself be dying.

3 major crashes in one decade, and we almost went down again last week. What is "law" really going to do?

Posted by: FormerSSResident | May 15, 2010 at 07:04 PM

I genuinely do not understand why this is such a problem. The share price of any institution that fails ought to be zero, in which case, the institution can be taken into the temporary ownership of the government for, say, one cent per share. The government are then free, as the new owners, to dispose of the business as they see fit, either through an orderly liquidation or recapitalisation and sale. In that way, any systemic shock can be avoided. Except for petty political prejudice against nationalisation, which it ought to be possible to set aside in an emergency, what is the problem with that solution?

Posted by: RebelEconomist | May 16, 2010 at 02:57 PM

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April 29, 2010


Consumer credit: More than meets the eye

A lot has been made (here, for a recent example) of the idea that banks have shown a surprising amount of reluctance to extend credit and to start making loans again. Indeed, the Fed's consumer credit report, which shows the aggregate amount of credit extended to individuals (excluding loans secured by real estate), has been on a steady downward trend since the fall of 2008.

Importantly, that report also provides a breakdown that shows how much credit the different types of institutions hold on their books. Commercial banks, which are the single largest category, accounted for about a third of the total stock in consumer credit in 2009. The two other largest categories—finance companies and securitized assets—accounted for a combined 45 percent. While commercial banks have been the biggest source of credit, they have not been the biggest direct source of the decline.

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The chart above highlights a somewhat divergent pattern among the big three credit holders. This pattern mainly indicates that credit from finance companies and securitized assets has been on a relatively steady decline since the fall of 2008 while credit from commercial banks has shown more of a leveling off. These details highlight a potential misconception that commercial banks are the primary driver behind the recent reduction in credit going to consumers (however, lending surveys certainly indicate that standards for credit have tightened).

To put a scale on these declines, the aggregate measure of consumer credit has declined by a total of 5.7 percent since its peak in December 2008 through February 2010. Over this same time period, credit from finance companies and securitizations declined by 16.2 percent and 12.4 percent, respectively, while commercial bank credit declined by 5.5 percent. Admittedly, securitization and off-balance sheet financing are a big part of banks' activity as they facilitate consumers' access to credit. The decline in securitized assets might not be that surprising given that the market started to freeze in 2007 and deteriorated further in 2008 as many investors fled the market. Including banks' securitized assets that are off the balance sheet would show a steeper decline in banks' holdings of consumer credit.

A significant factor in evaluating consumer credit is the pace of charge-offs, which can overstate the decline in underlying loan activity (charge-offs are loans that are not expected to be paid back and are removed from the books). Some (here and here) have made the point that the declines in credit card debt, for example, reflect increasing rates of charge-offs rather than consumers paying down their balances.

How much are charge-offs affecting the consumer credit data? Unfortunately, the Fed's consumer credit statistics don't include charge-offs. However, we can look at a different dataset that includes quarterly data on charge-offs for commercial banks to get an approximation. We can think of the change in consumer loan balances roughly as new loans minus loans repaid minus net loans charged off:

Change in Consumer Loans = [New Loans – Loan Repayments] – Net Charge-Offs

Adding net charge-offs to the change in consumer loans should give a cleaner estimate of underlying loan activity:

  042910c

If the adjusted series is negative, loan repayments should be greater than new loans extended, which would lend support to the idea that loans are declining because consumers are paying down their debt balances. If the adjusted series is positive, new loans extended should be greater than loan repayments and adds support to the hypothesis that part of the decline in the as-reported loans data is from banks removing the debt from their books because of doubtful collection. Both the as-reported and adjusted consumer loan series are plotted here:

042910b
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Notably, year-over-year growth in consumer loans adjusted for charge-offs has remained positive, which contrasts the negative growth in the as-reported series. That is, the net growth in new loans and loan repayments shows a positive (albeit slowing) growth rate once charge-offs are factored in. Over 2009, this estimate of charge-offs totaled about $27 billion while banks' average consumer loan balances declined by about $25 billion. Thus, a significant portion of the recent decline in consumer loan balances is the result of charge-offs.

Nevertheless, in an expanding economy, little or no credit growth implies a declining share of consumption financed through credit. Adjusting consumer loans for charge-offs suggests that the degree of consumer deleveraging across nonmortgage debt is somewhat less substantial than indicated by the headline numbers.

All in all, the consumer credit picture is a bit more complicated than it appears on the surface. A more detailed look suggests that banks haven't cut their consumer loan portfolios as drastically as sometimes assumed. The large run-up in charge-offs has also masked the underlying dynamics for loan creation and repayment. Factoring in charge-offs provides some evidence that a nontrivial part of consumer deleveraging is coming through charge-offs.

By Michael Hammill, economic policy analysis specialist in the Atlanta Fed's research department

April 29, 2010 in Banking, Capital Markets, Financial System, Saving, Capital, and Investment | Permalink

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Very nice.

One can get a slightly broader data set by using FDIC statistics on all insured institutions (http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/). It doesn't seem the results are substantially different: For end 2009 vs end 2008, an unadjusted drop of $29bn, vs an adjusted rise of $34bn.

Paul Kasriel recently did the same analysis for bank lending overall (full disclaimer - he mentions my website). http://web-xp2a-pws.ntrs.com/content//media/attachment/data/econ_research/1004/document/ec042910.pdf

Posted by: Jim Fickett | May 01, 2010 at 07:31 PM

you could have boiled off a lot of filler here and had quite a nice compact post
regardless well worth reading thanx

Posted by: paine | May 02, 2010 at 01:56 PM

A question: when there are charge-offs, do they include the late-payment penalties and other fees or only original principal?

Posted by: Daniil | May 03, 2010 at 10:21 AM

Two other general observations: First, although clearly implied by the post above, some readers commenting around the net have not noticed that we DON'T KNOW what the net growth in new consumer loans is, overall. Since charge-off data are available only for FDIC-insured institutions, we can't make the second graph above for the other categories of lending.

Second, and related, Felix Salmon did a post in March, linked to above, in which he concluded that consumers were not paying their cards down; in fact they were borrowing more. But the data he used, from CardHub, was mistaken -- it did not make the distinctions made in the post above, and applied the Fed charge-off rate, which is only for commercial banks, to the full revolving debt balance, from all sources. Many people are still under the impression of what Salmon wrote, but in fact we do not know whether it is true.

@Daniil: charge-offs are only principal. The accounting, in which the principal balance of loans outstanding is reduced by charge-offs, would not make sense otherwise.

Posted by: Jim FIckett | May 03, 2010 at 11:43 PM

@Jim My question is not about that. It's the following. There's a balance of $1000. I miss 3 payments and the bank assesses $200 worth of late charges and resets the interest rate after first missed payment so that after 3 months (let's say that's when the bank charges off the loan) my loan to the bank is $1300. So my total debt goes up. I don't know what's on banks books as a result of this. Do they discharge the 1000? 1300?
And even if 1300, then the total 'borrowing' might still be going up not because people are borrowing, but because they are falling behind.

Posted by: Daniil | May 05, 2010 at 04:54 PM

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April 06, 2010


Breaking up big banks: As usual, benefits come with a side of costs

Probably the least controversial proposition among an otherwise very controversial set of propositions on which financial reform proposals are based is that institutions deemed "too big to fail" (TBTF) are a real problem. As Fed Chairman Bernanke declared not too long ago:

As the crisis has shown, one of the greatest threats to the diversity and efficiency of our financial system is the pernicious problem of financial institutions that are deemed "too big to fail."

The next question, of course, is how to deal with that threat. At this point the debate gets contentious. One popular suggestion for dealing with the TBTF problem is to just make sure that no bank is "too big." Two scholars leading that charge are Simon Johnson and
James Kwak (who are among other things the proprietors at The Baseline Scenario blog). They make their case in the New York Times' Economix feature:

Since last fall, many leading central bankers including Mervyn King, Paul Volcker, Richard Fisher and Thomas Hoenig have come out in favor of either breaking up large banks or constraining their activities in ways that reduce taxpayers' exposure to potential failures. Senators Bernard Sanders and Ted Kaufman have also called for cutting large banks down to a size where they no longer pose a systemic threat to the financial system and the economy.

…We think that increased capital requirements are an important and valuable step toward ensuring a safer financial system. We just don't think they are enough. Nor are they the central issue…

We think the better solution is the "dumber" one: avoid having banks that are too big (or too complex) to fail in the first place.

Paul Krugman has noted one big potential problem with this line of attack:

As I argued in my last column, while the problem of "too big to fail" has gotten most of the attention—and while big banks deserve all the opprobrium they're getting—the core problem with our financial system isn't the size of the largest financial institutions. It is, instead, the fact that the current system doesn't limit risky behavior by "shadow banks," institutions—like Lehman Brothers—that carry out banking functions, that are perfectly capable of creating a banking crisis, but, because they issue debt rather than taking deposits, face minimal oversight.

In addition to that observation—which is the basis of calls for a systemic regulator that spans the financial system, and not just specific classes of financial institutions—there is another, very basic, economic question: Why are banks big?

To that question, there seems to be an answer: We have big banks because there are efficiencies associated with getting bigger—economies of scale. David Wheelock and Paul Wilson, of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Clemson University, respectively, sum up what they and other economists know about economies of scale in banking:

…our findings are consistent with other recent studies that find evidence of significant scale economies for large bank holding companies, as well as with the view that industry consolidation has been driven, at least in part, by scale economies. Further, our results have implications for policies intended to limit the size of banks to ensure competitive markets, to reduce the number of banks deemed "too-big-to-fail," or for other purposes. Although there may be benefits to imposing limits on the size of banks, our research points out potential costs of such intervention.

Writing at the National Review Online, the Cato Institute's Arnold Kling acknowledges the efficiency angle, and then dismisses it:

There's a long debate to be had about the maximum size to which a bank should be allowed to grow, and about how to go about breaking up banks that become too large. But I want to focus instead on the general objections to large banks.

The question can be examined from three perspectives. First, how much economic efficiency would be sacrificed by limiting the size of financial institutions? Second, how would such a policy affect systemic risk? Third, what would be the political economy of limiting banks' size?

It is the political economy that most concerns me…

If we had a free market in banking, very large banks would constitute evidence that there are commensurate economies of scale in the industry. But the reality is that our present large financial institutions probably owe their scale more to government policy than to economic advantages associated with their vast size.

I added the emphasis to the "probably" qualifier.

The Wheelock-Wilson evidence does not disprove the Kling assertion, as the estimates of scale economies are obtained using banks' cost structures, which certainly are impacted by the nature of government policy. But if economies of scale are in some way intrinsic to at least some aspects of banking—and not just political economy artifacts—the costs of placing restrictions on bank size could introduce risks that go beyond reducing the efficiency of the targeted financial institutions. If some banks are large for good economic reasons, the forces that move them to become big would likely emerge with force in the shadow banking system, exacerbating the very problem noted by Krugman.

I think it bears noting that the argument for something like constraining the size of particular banks implicitly assumes that it is not possible, for reasons that are either technical or political, to actually let failing large institutions fail. Maybe it is so, as Robert Reich asserts in a Huffington Post item today. And maybe it is in fact the case that big is not beautiful when it comes to financial institutions. But in evaluating the benefits of busting up the big guys, we shouldn't lose sight of the possibility that this is also a strategy that could carry very real costs.

By Dave Altig, senior vice president and research director at the Atlanta Fed

April 6, 2010 in Banking, Financial System, Regulation | Permalink

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I understand Krugman's argument, but doesn't it emphasise the importance of dealing with the TBTF problem for all types of financial institutions - whether deposit-taking or not? I agree that dealing with the TBTF problem only for depositary institutions is pointless - after all, the big failures of the current crisis were all non-banks (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG...) - but why should that be the end of the story? If PIMCO or Blackrock create systemic risk, that should be regulated - including structural remedies if necessary - just as it should if the culprit is Citi or Bank of America.

Posted by: Carlomagno | April 06, 2010 at 04:00 PM

Higher capital requirements might be one way to establish a driving force for reducing the size of a bank. Another one could be higher fees to pay for being a big bank, like an insurance premiums: because the damage of a bank failure would increase over proportionally with the size of the bank, the insurance payments should increase also with size and much more than linearly. If a bank wants to get bigger, to do some things better, it pays the price and is allowed to grow.

Posted by: Peter T | April 06, 2010 at 07:11 PM

The most obvious "economy of scale" associated with large banks is ability to influence the regulator. This is bad, not good, for the system even if it is good for bank profits.

The other key reason why banks might grow large is diversification -- but increased securitization should have reduced, not increased, the correlation between size and diversification. Computing power is even less plausible. Cross-selling never was plausible except to the extent that it involved the potential for profiting from breaches of client confidentiality.

Posted by: D Greenwood | April 08, 2010 at 09:07 AM

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March 10, 2010


Consumer credit, credit availability and The Credit CARD Act

Total consumer credit outstanding expanded by $5 billion in January after contracting 15 of the previous 17 months. Consumer credit outstanding includes revolving and nonrevolving credit. Revolving credit is mostly credit card debt, and nonrevolving credit includes loans for items such as vacations, autos, and boats. Even with the slight increase in January, total consumer credit (after adjusting for inflation) has contracted nearly 6 percent since the recession began in December 2007. This number might seem like a huge contraction but compared with three of the past four recessions, it actually looks rather typical. Consumer credit contracted 9 percent in the 1973–75 recession, 11 percent in the 1980 and 1981–82 recessions (treated as one recession here), and 8 percent in the 1990–91 recession.

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However, once the current recession is separated into revolving and nonrevolving credit, the relationship to past recessions changes. Typically in a recession, nonrevolving credit shrinks considerably while revolving credit shrinks little if at all. The trend so far in this recession has been the exact opposite; nonrevolving credit essentially has remained unchanged while revolving credit has shrunk 11 percent.

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Is the decline in consumer credit the result of supply- or demand-side forces? Perhaps the answer is both.

According to the Federal Reserve's Senior Loan Officer Survey, demand for all types of consumer loans (revolving and nonrevolving combined) has fallen since the first quarter of 2009. A decrease in demand for consumer loans is plausible because consumers tend to delay big purchases such as cars and vacations when uncertainty about future income increases. Because future income is affected by job prospects, consumer credit demand lags the recession much like employment does.

The chart below shows banks reporting an increase in willingness to make consumer loans. In fact, the fourth quarter of 2009 marked the first time in nearly three years that more banks reported increased willingness to supply consumer installment loans than have reported decreased willingness.

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Even if banks are more willing to make consumer loans, their lending standards have gotten tougher. Increased credit standards have moderated in recent months, but on average banks are still reporting tightening rather than easing based on the January Senior Loan Officer Survey. This tightening is particularly evident for consumers seeking revolving credit. In fact in the fourth quarter of 2009 banks on average reported increased tightening for credit limits of revolving credit compared with the previous three months. This development came as little surprise since a special question on the Senior Loan Officer Survey in October revealed that banks would tighten a wide range of their credit card policies following the enactment of the Credit CARD Act.

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Looking ahead, it will be interesting to see to what extent the tightening of standards for revolving credit impacts overall lending and to see if the Credit CARD Act ends up impacting revolving credit availability in the long run.

By Ellyn Terry, senior economic research analyst at the Atlanta Fed

March 10, 2010 in Banking | Permalink

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Would it not be useful to include the rising use of debit cards as a point of comparison to add perspective on the decline in revolving credit? As banks increased rates and added fees even those most in need of unsecured credit can quickly assess the cost of a 29+% loan versus using cash on hand that earns less than 1%.

Posted by: robert | March 10, 2010 at 05:18 PM

Credit is on the way out now. It's simply out of style. Look for more Aldi's and less Fresh Markets. More Kia and less BMW. More consignment, less Bloomingdales.

Oh, sure some people will still 'leverage' up. But the trends are overwhelmingly shifting to lower end discount services. We're poor and can't hide it any longer.

Posted by: FormerSSResident | March 11, 2010 at 08:19 PM

Ellyn,

what exactly is a loan on vacation? Vacation home? I don't remember I borrowed money to go on a vacation.

Posted by: J Chen | March 12, 2010 at 09:00 AM

It does make sense that people really wouldnt be spending all that much when in a recession. When your losing your home and possibly your job, it would be smart to not go out and charge up on your credit cards and put yourself into a much worse hole than you were already in.

Posted by: Steve "Debt Settlement Guru" B | May 27, 2010 at 11:27 AM

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February 19, 2010


Should the Fed stay in regulation?

One of the central issues in the postcrisis effort to reform our regulatory infrastructure is who should do the regulating. The answer to some in Congress is none of the above:

"… under consideration is a consolidated bank regulator, one aide [to Alabama Senator Richard Shelby] said. The idea is supported by [Connecticut Senator Christopher] Dodd, who proposed eliminating the Office of Thrift Supervision and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and moving their powers, along with the bank-supervision powers of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., to the new agency.

"Negotiators are still deciding how to monitor firms for systemic risk, including how to define and measure it, what authorities to give a regulator and which agency is best suited to get the power, a Shelby aide said."

As reported in The New York Times:

"The Senate and the Obama administration are nearing agreement on forming a council of regulators, led by the Treasury secretary, to identify systemic risk to the nation's financial system, officials said Wednesday…"

Though the idea of a council to provide regulatory and supervisory oversight is still contentious (the Times article offers multiple opinions from Federal Reserve officials) the formation of a council is not necessarily the same thing as removing the central bank from boots-on-the-ground, or operational, supervisory responsibility. In other words, there is still the question of how to monitor systemic risk and which agency is best suited to get the power.

Earlier this week I made note of a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper by Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell'Aricca, and Paulo Mauro, taking some issue with the proposal that central banks consider raising their long-run inflation objectives. Though that part of the paper seemed to attract almost all of the attention in the media and blogosphere, the discussion in the IMF article expanded well beyond that inflation target issue. Included among the many proposals of Blanchard et al. was this, on systemic risk regulation and the role of the central bank:

"If one accepts the notion that, together, monetary policy and regulation provide a large set of cyclical tools, this raises the issue of how coordination is achieved between the monetary and the regulatory authorities, or whether the central bank should be in charge of both.

"The increasing trend toward separation of the two may well have to be reversed. Central banks are an obvious candidate as macroprudential regulators. They are ideally positioned to monitor macroeconomic developments, and in several countries they already regulate the banks. 'Communication' debacles during the crisis (for example on the occasion of the bailout of Northern Rock) point to the problems involved in coordinating the actions of two separate agencies. And the potential implications of monetary policy decisions for leverage and risk taking also favor the centralization of macroprudential responsibilities within the central bank."

Consistent with the even-handedness of the Blanchard et al. paper, the authors did not come to this conclusion without noting the legitimate issues of those who would separate regulatory authority from the central bank:

"Against this solution, two arguments were given in the past against giving such power to the central bank. The first was that the central bank would take a 'softer' stance against inflation, since interest rate hikes may have a detrimental effect on bank balance sheets. The second was that the central bank would have a more complex mandate, and thus be less easily accountable. Both arguments have merit and, at a minimum, imply a need for further transparency if the central bank is given responsibility for regulation."

But, they conclude:

"The alternative, that is, separate monetary and regulatory authorities, seems worse."

I wonder, then: Would a regulatory council of which the Federal Reserve is a member, combined with operational supervisory responsibilities housed within the central bank, be a tolerably good response to Blanchard's and his colleagues' admonitions?

By Dave Altig, senior vice president and director of research at the Atlanta Fed

February 19, 2010 in Banking, Financial System, Regulation | Permalink

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The Fed is ill suited to a regulatory role. Regardless of the general trend, we have to deal with this Fed in this country, not central banks in general.

Why?

First, the Fed utterly dropped the ball on AIG which it had regulatory authority over. It had a reputation at the time for lax regulation and nothing has happened to change this impression. The Fed simply isn't set up to be a regulator in the same way as other bank regulatory agencies.

Second, few agencies are dispositionally less suited to monitor systemic risk. No federal government player is more focused on the short term here and now concerns of the economy. The Fed is a day to day, month to month participant in and manager of the markets. It does so in a very stylized, through, predictable way. It is all about the trees.

Systemic risk monitoring is fundamentally a long run, see the forest operation. Systemic risk is particularly likely to be hiding precisely where entities like the Fed are not out there collecting data. It is hiding off the books and in novel relationships.

Third, systemic risk regulation is a voice in the wilderness job. The regulator needs to zig when everyone else zags and defy the conventional wisdom of the establishment. The Fed is the establishment. The Fed uses mainstream economic models. The Fed's actions establish conventional wisdom. The Fed is at its most inept when the usual tools stop working in the usual ways (see stagflation). Putting systemic risk regulation in the Fed is to doom that regulator to group think and ideological capture.

Posted by: ohwilleke | February 19, 2010 at 07:14 PM

Do councils in regulatory authorities work? Any examples of where this works today? Seems like an excuse to meet X times a year and yet do nothing.

And, I wish Shelby good luck with defining exactly what all constitutes risk. That could be everything from CDS to police on the street. I think what they mean is "Banking system risk". That's only one part of this apparatus.

Posted by: FormerSSResident | February 21, 2010 at 11:22 AM

I think that regulators need to pay much closer attention to market structure rather than writing rules. For example, in the cash equity markets, they allow dark pools of liquidity, delayed price and volume reporting, payment for order flow, internalization of order flow. These things lead to distortions in the marketplace.

Just wrote a piece on fungibility at pointsandfigures.com.

Posted by: Jeff | February 21, 2010 at 01:13 PM

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