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October 14, 2008
How to build a better auction?
Though the bulk of the attention today has understandably turned to the U.S. Treasury announcement that $250 billion will be devoted to a U.S. bank recapitalization plan, there does still remain the notion that some of the government’s rescue funds will be devoted to purchasing troubled assets through some sort of auction mechanism. At least that’s the way it is according to Neel Kashkari, the Treasury’s point man on implementing the provisions of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. From Bloomberg:
“In addition to the stock-buying effort, other components of TARP include a whole loan purchase program, a mortgage-backed securities purchase program and an insurance program for those securities.
“[Kashkari] outlined three possible scenarios: ‘One, an auction purchase of troubled assets; two, a broad equity or direct purchase program; and three, a case of an intervention to prevent the impending failure of a systemically significant institution,’ he said.”
Thus, one of the more interesting logistical questions of the Treasury plan remains: How to design an auction that will generate “efficient” prices for assets that the government might purchase. A few days ago, Greg Mankiw linked to a proposal from University of Maryland professors Laurence Ausubel and Peter Cramton, which had earlier been noted by Felix Salmon. The key elements of the Ausebel and Cramton plan:
“An auction that determines a real price for a given security needs to require multiple holders of the security to compete with one another. This can be achieved if the Treasury purchases only some, not all, of any given security.
“Thus, a better approach [than a simple reverse auction for all eligible securities] would be for the Treasury to instead conduct a separate auction for each security and limit itself to buying perhaps 50% of the aggregate face value. Again, the auction starts at a high price and works its way down. If the security clears at 30 cents on the dollar, this means that the holders value it at 30 cents on the dollar. (If the value were only 15 cents, then most holders would supply 100% of their securities to be purchased at 30 cents, and the price would be pushed lower.) The auction then works as intended. The price is reasonably close to value. The ‘winners’ are the bidders who value the asset the least and value liquidity the most.”
Writing in Slate, Steve Landsburg offers up what I think is the same idea:
“Here's (roughly) how a ‘Bils-Kremer’ auction would work: First, put 10 similar distressed assets (such as a series of collateralized debt obligations) up for auction. At the close of the auction, the Treasury pays the winning bids for nine of these properties. The 10th property (chosen randomly) gets sold to the winning bidder.
“The advantage of a Bils-Kremer auction is that the Treasury buys assets and recapitalizes the firms holding those assets while paying only what some private bidder thought each property was worth. Now repeat with 10 more properties. And so on. Under this plan, nine-tenths of the liquidity comes from the Treasury, but ten-tenths of the price setting comes from the assessments of private investors with the incentive to bid judiciously. In other words, the prices can reasonably be considered fair.”
Anyone have a better option?
By David Altig, senior vice president and research director of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
October 14, 2008 in Financial System | Permalink
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Comments
Posted by:
James Moore |
October 14, 2008 at 09:48 PM
I don't understand Landsburg to be offering the same idea; in his construction, there are private buyers bidding to buy the security while the sellers bid to sell; it's like an "opening auction" on a stock exchange that does such a thing, and the US Treasury has put in a large order to buy at the market price. Ausebel and Cramton don't involve private buyers; it's just the sellers providing offering prices, and the treasury takes the nth lowest price.
Posted by:
dWj |
October 14, 2008 at 10:58 PM
The insane option is to form 10 (or so) corporations each with a (federal) corporate charter to buy a specific type (and grade, but with real grades this time) of asset. Sell preferred stock worth 20% of the corporation, but say 80% of the voting power on day to day items (i.e. not changing the focus or requirements). Then have the government buy in 80% at whatever level the stock sold for (using a google style auction IPO). Voila instant self guided money pools appropriate to market level. If the initially determined money pool is too small for a market segment you clone the corporation by doing the thing again.
Of course you would probably give the private investors a tiny nudge on the dividends. You'd also have to employ new style corporate governance, e-elections, no poison pills, instant no-confidence, etc.
Still this option avoids some of the pitfalls of the other options (where the private parties don't really have a reason to participate in the market except for nefarious ones, aside from the obvious collusion one, there is the hidden ability to use government money as leverage to "talk up" a market segment by overpaying). Not saying anyone would go for it of course.
Posted by:
yasth |
October 14, 2008 at 11:49 PM
If I held this mortgage paper, I would sort the customer database by zip code and add up the loan amounts by:
Gauging the value of the loans would be relatively easy as the segregated (by geographical region), measurement of the local market declines, are fairly accurate. I.e., zip codes in California & Florida would be marked down more than Kansas, etc.
This, of course, doesn't measure the credit worthiness of the borrower, rather the value of the debt instrument (house).
Presumably, the type of loan made by the lender, or their payment history, could be used to stratify anticipated mortgage payment returns. There are PhD's in Credit Management that could set up credit scoring.
I just can't believe that value of these securities can't be approximated with any accuracy.
Posted by:
flow5 |
October 15, 2008 at 04:07 PM
Let's keep it simple. Bernanke says he knows how to stop a deflation. The sequence of deflation fighting progressions was outlined in his infamous "It" speech of Nov. 21, 2002.
He is now down to the last item on the list: the "helicoptor drop" or "money gift". This was what TARP was supposed to accomplish. Therefore, all this talk about pricing mechanisms for the troubled assets is pure rubbish.
Posted by:
Anonymous |
October 15, 2008 at 11:50 PM
The problem with Steve's plan -- that 10% of the auction bids by private bidders go to private bidders -- is that it is subject to manipulation.
By submitting bids through proxies, a company could drive the price of its assets up without any costs. Winning 10% of the auctions just cycles money around in the company through its proxies, and the company makes a sizable profit on the other 90%.
The reverse auction is a better idea as long as the government can avoid accepting the high bids.
None of these mechanisms deal with the core problem with having the government purchase these so-called "toxic assets", that the scheme only helps the companies' balance sheets if the the government overpays for the assets. That raises the question of whether we should do it at all.
Posted by:
Greg |
October 16, 2008 at 10:30 AM
One thing that these auctions don't take into account is the counter party risk. Can the seller actually deliver? Do they have a balance sheet that can back up what they are selling?
It is a very difficult problem. Now that I have bought a security, how do I manage my risk associated with it? How do I resell it for a profit?
I like the idea of establishing a variety of central party clearing houses that will compete for the business. Each clearing house would certify the buyers and the sellers-ensuring that counter party risk is gone.
Buyers and sellers then can confidently make markets-and price in the risk to the asset they are bidding on accordingly without having to price in counter party risk. This should make for more competition in the bidding and offering, resulting in a better price.
Posted by:
jeff |
October 16, 2008 at 12:27 PM


I'm missing something pretty basic here.
Everyone keeps saying that we have a completely frozen market, with no bidders. Doesn't that mean we still have zero bidders in these auctions? If someone is willing to bid the hypothetical 15% of face value in some future auction, what stopped them from making that bid today? If they think 15% is a good price, they can offer it tomorrow morning and get all of them they can eat.
Seems like the fact that these securities haven't _already_ started selling is a problem. We know that an auction is going to happen, right? There's some uncertainty around how it's going to work, but presumably everyone thinks it's going to happen.
So why hasn't that fact, all by itself, caused the market to thaw? Surely someone's sitting on a pile of money, thinking to themselves "OK, I think the value in the future Fed auction is going to be three cheeseburgers. I'll go offer two-and-a-half cheeseburgers _right now_ and make a mint on these bad boys."
Seems like: a) it's is happening already, and the auctions won't matter much, or b) no one can figure out the value of these things, so there aren't any real bidders in the government auction either, or c) all of these things put together are worth something approximating three cheeseburgers, and are a waste of time to bid on.