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September 30, 2006
Upon Further Review...
At Angry Bear, pgl throws the yellow flag on Greg Mankiw:
Greg Mankiw commits an intellectual foul in my view as he graphs the ratio of the Federal government debt held by the public to GDP as if our payroll contributions to prefunding our Social Security benefits are really employment tax increases designed to pay for that tax cut for Bill Gates et al...
Is Greg Mankiw recommending this backdoor employment tax increase? If he is, his graph makes sense.
It is certainly true that "debt held by the public" does not include government liabilities held in the Social Security Trust Fund, and that deficits look a good measure larger if we exclude surpluses of payroll contributions over Social Security benefit payments:
So, Social Security surpluses do indeed finance current spending in any given year. But if those surpluses truly do represent "prefunding our Social Security benefits", then the future payments to beneficiaries will be paid out of the debt accumulated by the Social Security trust fund. And the assets of the trust fund are simply Treasury securities that the government keeps for itself.
Where will the funds to retire those securities come from? With no social security surpluses, the answer is general revenues -- mainly individual and corporate income taxes. While it is possible that some future Congress will choose to address the liability posed by trust fund claims by raising payroll taxes, that is not the default. It may be fair, of course, to warn of "backdoor" tax increases generically. Professor Mankiw says as much:
The looming problem with fiscal policy is the longer-term outlook, which will unfold over the next several decades as the baby-boom generation retires and starts collecting Social Security and Medicare. At that point, this series will start rising rapidly unless taxes are raised or spending is reduced compared with benefits promised under current law.
But a backdoor employment tax increase? Not necessarily.
UPDATE: Brad Delong notes, with approval, Jason Furman's comments at MaxSpeak :
My friend Greg Mankiw says we shouldn't be worried about the current fiscal situation, just the looming fiscal challenge. I'm not quite sure what to make of the statement, back in the Clinton administration our argument for running large surpluses and reducing the debt was precisely to prepare for the looming fiscal challenges.
First, although Greg can defend himself on this one, I think his point was pretty close to Jason's. Second, although there may have been arguments for running large surpluses, the only year in which non-trust-fund surpluses actually arose was 2000. Third, the policies in place at that time were arguably very far from addressing the "looming fiscal challenges."
Just to anticipate the response to these comments, I am not arguing for or against economic policies put into place post-2000. The fact, clearly articulated in the Mankiw post, is that structural imbalances in entitlement programs have not been addressed. They weren't addressed then, they are not being addressed now.
September 30, 2006 in Federal Debt and Deficits | Permalink
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Comments
Posted by:
Don Lloyd |
September 30, 2006 at 01:24 PM
I like your picture of the two measures of the deficit. My latest shows the two measures of debt to GDP. I withdraw the yellow card on Mankiw and pull out the red card (soccer analogy) to CEA chair Crazy Eddie.
Posted by:
pgl |
September 30, 2006 at 03:30 PM
Even nicer update pointing to Gokhale's 1998 concern that fiscal policy might not stay on a long-run solvency path. He mentioned uncertaintities - with the big one now being resolved: policy makers beginning in 2001 decided to derail the solvency path - BIG TIME!
Posted by:
pgl |
October 01, 2006 at 09:50 AM
Not only in the long run, but also in the short run the statements about the size of the deficit are conditional.
If we are at the midpoint of a long economic expansion with years of trend or above trend growth ahead of us the debt is reasonable.
But if on the other hand we are on the verge of a significant economic downturn where the defict will rise sharply ending the cycle with debt already at this level is not a reasonable policy.
Posted by:
spencer |
October 02, 2006 at 11:21 AM


David,
I think that you have a pretty clean picture, but that it might be clearer with a couple of assumptions that could be true, but which don't have to be to contribute to the big picture.
Assume that there will be no tax increases of any kind, and no benefit cuts of any kind, and that the scheduled benefits will actually be paid out in full. Also assume whatever future economic and demographic trajectory projections that you feel most comfortable with.
Unless I've missed something, the only variable left to align all of the above assumptions is new borrowing from the public.
Either at some year in the future the payroll tax receipts will start to fall short of mandated benefit payouts or they won't. If they won't ever fall short, then we don't have a problem and there is nothing to discuss.
However, there is near universal agreement that some time in the 2018 timeframe, there will indeed start to be a shortfall.
For simplicity, let the first year's shortfall be $100M. What happens?
First, given all of the above assumptions,the Treasury must sell $100M in new debt to the public.
Secondly, the Treasury must give the $100M proceeds to the SSA to pay out in benefits. In exchange, the SSA will return $100M of its internal bonds for retirement, cancelling the obligation that they represent.
For a number of years thereafter, probably more than 20 or 25, the exact same process will be repeated for increasing sums, possibly to $200B, just for discussion.
The process as described above is only interrupted by the exhaustion of SS Trust Fund, as its bonds and their interest have all been retired/redeemed.
Let's say that in 2043 the last $200B of SSTF bonds are retired in exchange for $200B of new borrowing from the public.
If the 2044 shortfall is $201B, and the SSTF is empty, what happens?
Again, assuming along with everything else above that all mandated benefit payments are made, the Treasury must borrow an additional $201B from the public and turn it over to the SSA even though there are no remaining bonds to retire. This likely requires Congressional approval, but is there any likelihood that Congress will allow benefits to fall short of mandates by $201B in 2044 (maybe by 28%) just to avoid a new public borrowing of $201B when the 2043 level was $200B? The bad news is the $201B to be borrowed. The good news is that there are no further SSTF bonds to be retired. If $200B in new borrowing wasn't worth avoiding in 2043, then why would $201B in 2044 be any more of a problem?
Of course they would both really be problems, but it should be clear that the proximate cause and degree of the problem has everything to do with the shortfall, and nothing to do with the exhaustion of the SSTF.
In this light, it should be clear that the PAST increases in the payroll tax were indeed employment tax increases, and that the resulting surpluses were of no help at all in paying future benefits when shortfalls appear(ed).
While it is possible for individuals to save to prefund future purchases or expenses, it is almost impossible for a government to do so, certainly using the existing method.
Regards, Don